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ARTICLE
MAKE LAW, NOT WAR: SOLVING THE FAITH/EQUALITY
CRISIS
Anton Sorkin†
“For, happily, the Government of the United States, which gives
to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance, requires only
that they who live under its protection should demean
themselves as good citizens in giving it on all occasions their
effectual support.”
George Washington1
ABSTRACT
Within the last few years, there have been a number of cases moving
through streams of state litigation involving small business owners who
open their businesses to the public and get in trouble for refusing to serve
members of the LGBT community. In all of these instances, the issue that
the employees are contesting is that their refusal to provide some specific
service is disconnected from the customer’s sexual orientation, but is,
instead, linked to the seeming endorsement of the activity for which the
service is provided (e.g., a wedding cake goes towards endorsing the
marriage). Courts, for the most part, have ignored this distinction and
treated refusals to provide a requested service as a per se rejection of that
person’s identity because the activity is considered to be “inextricably”
connected with that person’s dignity (e.g., marriage for homosexuality).
This Article argues that this “non-distinction approach” is really a legal
fiction (something counter to known facts), which advances the interest of
the court in using antidiscrimination laws for the sake of socially
engineering an atmosphere that protects the LGBT-community from
† Anton Sorkin (JD, LLM, SJD Candidate) is an employment attorney in Atlanta and a
doctorate student working part-time with the Restoring Religious Freedom Project at the
Center for the Study of Law & Religion (Emory University School of Law). I’d like to
acknowledge Professors Mark Goldfeder and Craig Stern for their helpful feedback on the
topic. This Article was first presented at the Fourth ICLARs Conference at St. Hugh’s College
in Oxford, England on September 8-11, 2016.
1. George Washington, Letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, in
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 6:825 (Aug. 21, 1790) (W.W. Abbot et al. ed. 1987)
(emphasis added).
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dignitary harm. While an important process, the pursuit has incorrectly
conflated the forms of discrimination (i.e., identity vs. conduct) thereby
disarming the potential for First Amendment defenses to shine light on the
conflict.
My solution is simple. Courts should replace the legal fiction (i.e., the
non-distinction approach) with a rebuttable presumption. They can still
assume that the discriminatory intent is the type that should be covered
under antidiscrimination laws, but also should provide an opportunity for
religious claimants to rebut that presumption by: (1) showing a sincerely
held belief; (2) showing that the requested service is part of those expressive
acts protected by the First Amendment; and (3) showing that readily
alternative means exist for acquiring the sought after services.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, the American culture has seen a raging war between
two rival communities in their effort for increased recognition in the legal
market.2 On one side, the religious liberty community realized a major
victory in the 2014 case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, when the Supreme Court
fortified the protections granted under the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act by enshrining traditional, high-level protection for religious
claimants lost after Employment Division v. Smith.3 On the other side, the
LGBT-community gained a decisive victory in 2015, when the Supreme
Court legalized same-sex marriage across all fifty states.4 Despite each
having gained important legal victories, both communities find themselves
at an impasse, progressively in search of what religious liberty expert
Douglas Laycock calls a “total win.”5
2. Richard Garnett, Wrongful Discrimination?, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY
RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 70 (Timothy S. Shah et al
eds., 2016); see also SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICT
(Douglas Laylock et al eds., 2008).
3. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2772 (2014); Emp’t Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015); see also Linda C. McClain, Civil
Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, “Moral Disapproval,” and Tensions between Religious Liberty
and Equality, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE, supra note 2, at 95–108 (previewing relevant US Supreme Court
jurisprudence leading up to Obergefell).
5. Steven D. Smith, Die and Let Live? The Asymmetry of Accommodation, in RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, supra
note 2, at 182 (noting that Douglas Laycock believes a mutual compromise has not been
reached because both parties are “intransigent” and want a “total win”). As noted by
Professor Robin F. Wilson: “History shows that compromise facilitates social progress” and
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While both communities have found success in the courts, they remain
facing many challenges. On one hand, the LGBT-community continues
fighting to be recognized in their persons and in their lifestyles; to leave
behind those times in the aftermath of the Second World War where the
law and social conventions challenged the very notion that “gays and
lesbians had a just claim to dignity.”6 From the 1990s until very recently, the
United States saw a clash of political and ideological battles waging between
the so-called religious right and the LGBT-community over the extension of
rights for gay couples.7 As a shadow of things to come, in March of 1993,

“[o]nly compromise will yield significant protections for religious objectors and significant
protections for the LGBT community against discrimination.” Robin F. Wilson, The Politics
of Accommodation, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, supra note 2, at 133, 136. Two sources in particular illustrate the
intransigence noted by Douglas Laycock. See Joseph William Singer, We Don't Serve Your
Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 931 (2015)
(the “biblical support” used in favor of segregation has been “revived by businesses seeking
to deny services to LGBT customers . . . .”); Shannon Gilreath & Arley Ward, Same-Sex
Marriage, Religious Accommodation, and the Race Analogy, WAKE FOREST UNIV. LEGAL
STUDIES PAPER NO. 2748565, at 4 (2016) (“campaign for the continued second-class
citizenship of gay Americans under the banner of religious liberty is gaining vengeful
steam”), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2748565.
Douglas Laycock offers the advice for both sides that to insist on a total victory for only your
side is bad for liberty. Jaime Margolis, Freedom of Religion vs. Sexual Freedom—A Conflict
SCH.
OF
L.
(Feb.
18,
2015),
Between
Liberties?
B.U.
http://www.bu.edu/law/2015/02/18/freedom-of-religion-vs-sexual-freedom-a-conflictbetween-liberties/; see also John McCormack, UVA Law Prof Who Supports Gay Marriage
Explains Why He Supports Indiana's Religious Freedom Law, WEEKEND STANDARD (Mar. 29,
2015), http://www.weeklystandard.com/uva-law-prof-who-supports-gay-marriage-explainswhy-he-supports-indianas-religious-freedom-law/article/902928 (Laycock notes that
“[m]ost of the activists in this fight, on both sides, want liberty and justice only for their side .
. . to crush the other side”); Doug Mainwaring, Same-Sex Marriage: We’re Playing Chess, Not
DISCOURSE
(Mar.
20,
2013),
Checkers,
PUBLIC
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/03/9622/ (“national discussion of same-sex
marriage treats the issue like a game of checkers, where opponents can quickly gain each
other’s pieces without much forethought about the consequences”).
6. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct at 2596. This history has been thoroughly outlined by William
Eskridge—serving as a reminder of our collective failure to treat the gay community equally.
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAY LAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET (1999).
7. Donald P. Haider, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, in AFTER MARRIAGE EQUALITY
42 (Carolos A. Ball ed., 2016). Very recently in fact, the Texas Supreme Court reversed a
prior ruling and set a date in March for oral argument on the issue of whether same-sex
spousal benefits should be provided for municipal employees. Associated Press, Texas Court
Hearing Case to Limit Gay Marriage Legalization, FORTUNE (Jan. 21, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/01/21/gay-marriage-legalization-texas/.
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the Hawaii Supreme Court issued a ruling where it questioned the
constitutionality of denying same-sex couples the right to marry.8 That
same year, in November, President Bill Clinton signed into law the
“Religious Freedom Restoration Act” (RFRA) that extended robust
protection for the free exercise of religion in response to the Supreme Court
ruling in Employment Division v. Smith.9 Today, RFRA is considered to be
among the major impediments to LGBT-equality.10 On the other side,
decisions like Romer v. Evans (1996), Lawrence v. Texas (2003), and United
States v. Windsor (2013) have become landmark cases helping advance the
“lived equality” goals of modern advocates for the LGBT-community.11
With same-sex marriage finally legalized and the United States having
overcome its sultry practices of criminalizing homosexuality,12 much work
still remains in ensuring that the LGBT-community is protected from
widespread bullying and discrimination,13 which impairs their ability to

8. See CARLOS A. BALL, Introduction, in AFTER MARRIAGE EQUALITY 2–3 (2016) (citing
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)).
9. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–13 (1997).
10. See HAIDER, supra note 7, at 46–48.
11. See Clifford Rosky, Still Not Equal, in AFTER MARRIAGE EQUALITY 74 (Carlos A. Ball
ed., 2016) (“measured by reference to ‘equality of outcomes and community well-being’”).
12. William N. Eskridge, in his comprehensive recitation of the history of legal
regulations involving the LGBT-community, writes of laws throughout history against
homosexual conduct and the potential for police brutality as a response to things like, e.g.,
“dancing with someone of the same-sex, cross-dressing, propositioning another adult
homosexual, possessing a homophile publication, writing about homosexuality without
disapproval, displaying pictures” or having actual sexual intercourse, a felony in all but one
state, that often times came with it “possible indefinite incarceration as a sexual psychopath.”
ESKRIDGE, supra note 6, at 98.
13. See BALL, supra note 8, at 6 (“It is a grave mistake to believe that the favorable
resolution of the marriage equality questions somehow represent the end of the struggle for
LGBT equality in this country.”). A recent report from the Human Rights Watch
demonstrates this fact when it outlines on-going trends showing how the modern school
system remains a hostile environment for LGBT-students. Ryan Thoreson, “Like Walking
Through a Hailstorm:” Discrimination Against LGBT Youth in US Schools”, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/07/walking-throughhailstorm/discrimination-against-lgbt-youth-us-schools. On top of this, the LGBTcommunity remains in wait for statewide protection against sexual orientation
discrimination in housing, hiring, and public accommodations. Wilson, supra note 5, at 133,
149; HAIDER, supra note 7, at 50–51 (provides Table illustrating states that passed
employment antidiscrimination laws in relation to when those states reached marriage
equality); Maps of State Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (interactive map),
http://www.hrc.org/state_maps; see also ROSKY, supra note 11, at 75 (“[a] freedom to marry .
. . doesn't mean nearly as much when you’re unemployed, homeless, uninsured, or
imprisoned”).
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enjoy the fruits of their “new” citizenship.14 On the other side, religious
liberty has also faced a number of recent challenges, particularly in the
context of public accommodation laws where the conscience of Christians
collides with service requests made by gay-couples in anticipation of
wedding ceremonies. Richard Samuelson, writing in Mosaic Magazine,
notes this much when he writes that personal identity in the context of the
gay-rights movement “has resulted in a legal battle in which the radioactive
charge of ‘discrimination,’ borrowed from the civil-rights movement of the
1960s, is wielded as a weapon to isolate, impugn, and penalize dissenting
views held by Americans of faith and informing the conduct of their
religious lives.”15
The material below discusses this conflict in great detail while attempting
to pry open the spaces for distinguishing the type of discrimination as a
society we are rightfully mindful to eradicate, and the type that falls within
the protections of the First Amendment. It attempts to find common
ground toward establishing limiting principles in order to restore a rightful
relationship between two warring communities in an effort to restore a
14. As noted by Professor Clifford Rosky, now that the battle over marriage has been
won, the shift will be towards a comprehensive effort towards passing antidiscrimination
laws—particularly among “red states.” ROSKY, supra note 11, at 79; see also HAIDER, supra
note 7, at 54 (early advocate for marriage equality in Massachusetts envisioned their work to
be an effort to ensure everyone across the state can go “cradle to grave without
discrimination and oppression based on sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender
expression”). I say “new” given the second-class citizenship status placed on the LGBTcommunity akin to the second-class citizenship faced by the black community that placed
them in a position of “walled-off inferiority.” Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427 (1960). Eskridge notes that he believes this
“second-class” status remained as of 1999, when things like laws against marriage and
sodomy remained that have now been lifted. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 6, at 139; see also
Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meaning, 97
VA. L. REV. 1267, 1308 (2011) (“[l]aws banning same-sex marriage also appear to brand
citizens as second-class”). For example, in 1962, Frank Kameny led a movement soliciting
then Attorney General Robert Kennedy for the gay community to be granted equal
citizenship beginning with the fight against employment discrimination. See ESKRIDGE, supra
note 6, at 125. Eskridge writes that by 1981, the gay right movement had won many
important victories that “partially dismantled the apartheid of the closet, whereby gay people
were formally excluded from citizenship and left to a sociopolitical state of nature.” Id. at
139.
15. Richard Samuelson, “Who’s Afraid of Religious Liberty?,” MOSAIC (Aug. 1, 2016),
https://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/2016/08/whos-afraid-of-religious-liberty/. Perhaps no
academic has been more strident than Wake Forest Professor Shannon Gilreath, who writes
that distinguishing anti-gay discrimination with anti-black discrimination is merely a
“convenient smoke screen enabling bigots to mask their true animus.” Gilreath, supra note 5,
at 9.
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much-needed balance in our society. Section II discusses the broader
purposes of antidiscrimination laws and the various themes interwoven
throughout this Article. Section III discusses the important cases that have
yielded courts applying the non-distinction approach in conflicts between
the religious and LGBT-community. Section IV delves into the history and
use of legal fictions of the type being used in cases found in the antecedent
Section. Section V discusses the non-distinction approach introduced in
Section III, then responds to some of the arguments used by courts to
conflate the forms of discrimination and offers a three-part analysis to
replace the current approach that allows for religious claimants to offer First
Amendment defenses toward accommodation.
II. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL ENGINEERING
Antidiscrimination laws, in particular those exemplified in response to
invidious discrimination against the African-American community, at their
basis, have the policy of social transformation.16 These policies reflect
“evolving conceptions of equality tracing back” to the Declaration of
Independence that announced that “all men are created equal” by virtue of
an immutable Creator.17 As a result, antidiscrimination laws seek to move a
culture towards equality, if not through an organic process of independent
decision-making, then through a form of social engineering or social
16. See Robert C. Post, The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, in PREJUDICIAL
APPEARANCES 20 (2001) (“Antidiscrimination law understands itself as transformative, as
fundamentally altering existing social arrangements”); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights,
Religious Accommodations, and the Purpose of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 619,
627 (2015) (“they are the amelioration of economic inequality, the prevention of dignitary
harm, and the stigmatization of discrimination”); Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public
Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons to Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177, 179, 191 (2015)
(“a fundamental purpose of antidiscrimination law . . . is to change norms”); see also ROSKY,
supra note 11, at 77 (“antidiscrimination laws . . . signal the public inclusion of LGBT people
within the community itself”). Koppelman writes: “Antidiscrimination law is an intervention
that aims at systemic effect in society, dismantling longstanding structures of dominance and
subordination.” Koppelman, supra, at 639. According to Robert C. Post, American
antidiscrimination law is driven by a logic “that expresses the essential principles of postWorld War II American liberalism . . . stress[ing] both the inherent dignity of each
individual and the need for a rational and efficient economy.” Robert C. Post, The Logic of
American Antidiscrimination Law, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES 1 (2001).
17. Brief of Legal Scholars in Support of Equality and Religious and Expressive Freedom
as Amici Curiae, in Support of Appellants, State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers; Ingersoll
and Freed v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 91615-2, at 11 [hereinafter “Legal Scholar’s Brief”],
available
at
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A08/916152%20Amici%20%20Legal%20Scholars.pdf; see also Carlos A. Ball, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, 84 UMKC
L. REV. 639, 642 (2016) (“assessments of bigotry . . . change as society changes”).
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reconstruction.18 As stated by Joseph Singer, antidiscrimination laws ensure
that despised groups enjoy equal “access to the world of the market without
regard to invidious discrimination.”19 As a consequence of this thinking, the
question posed by ACLU legal counsel, Louise Melling, is illustrative of the
grand narrative of this Article: “Why grant accommodations for religious
objectors in today’s anti-discrimination laws when similar calls were
rejected in the context of civil rights?”20
A. The Koppelman Balance
Andrew Koppelman helpfully outlines the role that antidiscrimination
laws play as tools for social engineering.21 He writes that such laws serve a
transformative function in society—by not only changing the structure
through state action,22 but also changing the conscience of bigotry.23 While
focusing primarily on the role antidiscrimination laws played in eliminating
racism, Koppelman lays out the principles equally applicable for ridding socalled bigotry against the LGBT-community, noting that “we cannot do

18. See Koppelman, supra note 16, at 651.
19. Singer, supra note 5, at 939.
20. Melling, supra note 16, at 183. Melling characteristically comes down on the side of
rejecting any form of accommodation, which remains consistent with the ACLU’s approach
to the issue. Id. at 185.
21. Koppelman’s own approach to reconciling the “refusal to serve the LGBTcommunity” dilemma involves a right for the religious business owners stating their
concerns ahead of time to avoid the dignitary harm that comes (particularly) from a face-toface refusal. Koppelman, supra note 16, at 628, 646–47; Andrew Koppelman, A Free Speech
Response to the Gay Rights/Religious Liberty Conflict, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1128 (2016).
22. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY 7 (1996)
(“[T]his project of cultural transformation is one in which the state is appropriately enlisted
where it can be helpful.”); Koppelman, supra note 16, at 620 (“Gay rights advocates have
misconceived the tort of discrimination as a particularized injury to the person, rather than
the artifact of social engineering that it really is.”).
23. Koppelman notes that from the standpoint of racism, transformation must be made
in not only the condition of blacks, but also the consciousness of whites. KOPPELMAN, supra
note 22, at 2. Martin Luther King made similar utterances, poignantly appealing to the
conscience of the nation to see the disease of racism:
Like a boil that can never be cured as long as it is covered up but must be
opened with all its pus-flowing ugliness to the natural medicines of air and
light, injustice must likewise be exposed, with all of the tension its exposure
creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before
it can be cured.
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE 295 (1986).
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justice to [traditionally oppressed] groups unless we change our very
patterns of cultural expression and unconscious thinking.”24
However, Koppelman also mentions competing traditional and liberal
concerns that he goes on to address in the pursuit of social equality.25 Being
mindful that the “scope is limited . . . by the very magnitude of the evil it
seeks to combat,” Koppelman warns that without a proper understanding of
the goals and the corresponding level of danger,26 antidiscrimination laws
used toward social change will fail to strike a proper balance.27 Most
importantly, Koppelman notes that antidiscrimination laws should not
always trump other values, echoing the words of Edmund Burke, who said
that “it is better that the whole should be imperfect . . . than that, while
some parts are provided for with great exactness, others might be totally
neglected, or perhaps materially injured, by the over-care of a favourite [sic]
member.”28 While in some instances an established orthodoxy may be
imposed; in other areas, religious claimants should be provided opportunity
to appeal to the devices of argumentation and convince decision-makers to
rule in their favor.29
24. KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 7. “[T]he ultimate goal of antidiscrimination law is to
eliminate not merely racial inequality but racism itself.” Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Where “the evil is local or of a modest scale, then measures to remedy it may be
correspondingly confined;” however, where the “evil is broad and pervasive, then the effort
to end it must be a correspondingly broad and ambitious project.” Id. at 13.
27. Id. at 11.
28. KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 109.
29. Id. at 113; see also Brief for Petitioners, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 2000 WL
228616, at 47 (2000) (“It is our belief that controversial questions of personal morality, often
involving religious conviction, are best tested and resolved within the private marketplace of
ideas, and not as the subject of government-imposed orthodoxy.”). As Koppelam notes, one
of the paradoxes of his antidiscrimination laws as social transformation project is that it
“requires both intellectual conformity and intellectual courage, and these requirements work
at cross-purposes.” KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 113. Later on, he cites to Rawls in claiming
that a liberal state, in some instances, is entitled to take “steps to strengthen the virtues of
toleration ad mutual trust, say by discouraging various kinds of religious and racial
discrimination (in ways consistent with liberty of conscience and freedom of speech).” Id. at
196. Antidiscrimination principles allows us to return to the “original position” and move
forward unencumbered by prejudices. See Robert C. Post, The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES 16, 19 (2001) (antidiscrimination laws
spring “from the noble liberal impulse to protect persons from the indignities of prejudicial
mistreatment”). The contribution from Maggie Gallagher however is important in wrestling
with the dangers of equality as opposed to an emphasis on liberty:
Liberty arguments lead to pluralism, which requires us to tolerate those with
whom we disagree and affirm their core rights. Equality arguments lead to the
expansion of state power to repress and marginalize anti-equality bigots. The
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B. Dignitary, Harm & Stigmatization
Another thread that runs throughout this Article and relates closely to
the discussion of social transformation is the underlying focus on ridding
stigma30 and dignitary harm—including harms to children,31 harms from
pressure to conform with heteronormative stereotypes based on fears of
discrimination,32 and the humiliation of being denied service in places open
to the public.33 In Koppleman’s iteration of the “stigma theory,” he outlines
leading thinkers on the subject in an effort to show the dignitary harm
associated with discrimination is one meant to disenfranchise the individual
from full-participation in society.34 As a result, a “society devoted to the idea
fusion of liberty and equality rights in the gay rights debates represents the
biggest intellectual and conceptual challenge to finding a path to pluralism.
Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 5 Nw.
J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 260, 270 (2010). Samuel Gregg makes the observation that egalitarianism
tends to destroy the distinctiveness of religion and reduce it to “inoffensive banalities”—
rendered ineffectual to speak truth and to teach virtue. Samuel Gregg, Tocqueville and
DISCOURSE
(Jan,
19,
2017),
Democracy’s
Fall
in
America,
PUBLIC
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2017/01/18147/; see also Kurt Vonnegut, Harrison
Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7 (2014) (“The Year was 2081, and everybody
was finally equal. They weren't only equal before God and the law. They were equal every
which way. Nobody was smarter than anybody else. Nobody was better looking than
anybody else. Nobody was stronger or quicker than anybody else.”).
30. “One goal of antidiscrimination protection of gay people is cultural transformation:
to stigmatize stigma, and make the prejudicial that had been pervasive in society into
something that citizens instinctively reject.” Koppelman, supra note 16, at 649.
31. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600–01 (stating that the “marriage laws at issue thus
harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples”).
32. Paul Vincent Courtney, Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Public
Accommodations: A Common Law Approach, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1534 (2015).
33. Singer, supra note 5, at 940-41 (stating that the “question is whether a storeowner
has a right, in a free and democratic society, to treat a customer like a pariah”). As the
Supreme Court said, “Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and
movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely feel
when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public.” Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 292 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Koppelman and others
have also done well to illustrate the consequential harm that comes with being refused
service independent of an intent to discriminate. KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 57-114;
Koppelman, supra note 16, at 644–53; Ball, supra note 17, at 649–50 (pointing out that
Justice Kennedy in Obergefell did not tie harm and stigma to intent or state of mind for those
who voted to defend traditional marriage, instead focusing “exclusively on the
consequences”).
34. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 58-59; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976
Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6
(1977) ("the essence of any stigma lies in the fact that the affected individual is regarded as an
unequal in some respect”); see also STEVEN B. SMITH, HEGEL’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM:
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of equal citizenship . . . will repudiate those inequalities that impose the
stigma of caste.”35
As it relates to the treatment of blacks, Justice Warren echoed this
principle in the context of school segregation when he said that to “separate
them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”36
Likewise, Justice Kennedy in Obergefell noted that to deny the same-sex
couple an equal right to marry is to “impose stigma and injury of the kind
prohibited by our basic charter.”37 With this in mind, it makes sense why
legal intervention provides a benefit for those being harmed filtered
through a lens of creating a more just culture.38 As Steven B. Smith writes in
reflection on Hegel’s Theory of Rights, the desire for recognition by those
around us is “the standard by which to judge the adequacy of our political
institutions and the quality of our civic life.”39
Further, Koppelman connects history as a basis for placing the stigma
theory central to antidiscrimination norms, namely the eradication of
“badges and incident of slavery”40 or “to eradicate the last vestiges and
incidents of a society half slave and half free.”41 Recall that in the aftermath
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 117 (1989) (“For the desire for recognition is a desire unlike others. It is
a socially mediated desire insofar as the enjoyment of respect depends upon gaining the
approbation of others.”) Also illustrative is Koppelman’s cite to Paul Brest, who writes:
A second and independent rationale for the antidiscrimination principle is the
prevention of the harms which may result from race-dependent decisions.
Often, the most obvious harm is the denial of the opportunity to secure a
desired benefit — a job, a night's lodging at a motel, a vote. But this does not
completely describe the consequences of race-dependent decision making.
Decisions based on assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indifference
inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their victims as inferior. Moreover,
because acts of discrimination tend to occur in pervasive patterns, their victims
suffer especially frustrating, cumulative and debilitating injuries.
Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1976).
35. KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 59.
36. Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (emphasis added).
37. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
38. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE? 107 (2009).
39. SMITH, supra note 34, at 117. We can envision the role of antidiscrimination laws
similar to how Hegel saw the role of the political order in seeking to rectify the “inadequacies
of nature.” Id. at 115.
40. Cf. Singer, supra note 5, at 933, 941 (noting that a Mississippi statute to this day
allows businesses to choose their customers “at will”).
41. SMITH, supra note 34, at 63 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440,
441 n.78 (1968)).
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of the Civil War, so-called Black Codes aimed to restore the black
community to their place of servitude.42 These racist counter-measures
required increasing efforts by courts, legislators (particularly
antidiscrimination laws), and social movements to undo in order for the
society to shed itself of its depravity. Corresponding with concerns that
many states have failed to pass adequate laws to protect the LGBT
community,43 Professor Joseph W. Singer describes the comparable absence
of remedy at common law in New York against race-based discrimination
at retail stores in the absence of civil rights statutes.44 As noted by other
writers, progress was slow—as of 1949, only eighteen states took the added
measure of enacting public accommodations statutes to protect the black
community from invidious discrimination—demanding for a social
movement to expedite the process of equality.45 On top of this, Michael J.
Klarman notes how “opinion polls in the 1950s revealed that over 90
percent of whites, even outside the South, opposed interracial marriage.”46
By the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, only one black child in one
hundred attended mixed race schools in the South.47 A social movement
was necessary because, in the words of Martin Luther King, “freedom is
never voluntarily given by the oppressor;” it is not in its nature.48

42. See Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1283, 1350, 1352 (1996) (“[When] the Black Codes were passed,
they were understood by everyone as attempts to deny freedom and equality rather than to
promote them”); KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 13–14 (“Black Codes . . . [were] an attempt to
restore slavery to the greatest extent consistent with formal emancipation”).
43. See Courtney, supra note 32, at 1500-01.
44. See Singer, supra note 42, 1290-91; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1996)
(“The common-law rules, however, proved insufficient in many instances . . . . In
consequence, most States have chosen to counter discrimination by enacting detailed
statutory schemes.”). Joseph Singer describe these insufficiencies as follows:
The presumption, in other words, is that businesses, as property owners, have
the right to exclude non-owners unless that right is limited by statute.
Businesses similarly have the right to refuse to contract with anyone with
whom they do not wish to deal unless required to do so by express statutory
command. This presumption appears to be the law in every jurisdiction in the
United States except the State of New Jersey.
Singer, supra note 42, at 1290; see also Courtney, supra note 32, at 1504–12 (discussing the
common law duty to serve).
45. Courtney, supra note 32, at 1512–13; see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW
TO CIVIL RIGHTS 363 (2004) (noting that without “broad social currents” like the civil right
movement, courts would have accomplished even less in ending segregation).
46. KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 321.
47. Id. at 362.
48. MARTIN LUTHER KING, supra note 23, at 292.
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These sentiments certainly make the present struggle of the LGBTcommunity in similar need for widespread antidiscrimination laws.
Koppelman notes that among the earliest victories for the gay rights
movement was when some of the major institutions in America “embraced
the view that discrimination against gay people is, in at least some respects,
analogous to racism.”49 Today, taking on the lessons of history, the ACLU’s
Deputy Legal Director, in comparing historical race-based discrimination
with todays perceived sexual orientation discrimination, said that we cannot
“remedy discrimination and historical exclusion if we sanction such
indignities.”50
49. KOPPELMAN, supra note 38, at 45; see also DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, YOU CANT’ SAY THAT!
11 (2003) (“[F]rom the late 1970s until the early 1990s courts abandoned civil liberties in
favor of antidiscrimination principles with stunning blitheness”); Forum v. Rumsfeld, 390
F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2004), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. &
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (“In the 1970s law schools began expanding
[there discrimination] policies to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation”).
Examples of this transformation can be seen, for example, in 1978 when Yale Law School
included sexual orientation as part of their general policy against discrimination. Burt v.
Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 166 (D. Conn. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Burt v. Gates, 502 F.3d
183 (2d Cir. 2007). Further, in response to this trend “the American Association of Law
Schools . . . voted unanimously in 1990 to include sexual orientation as a protected category.”
Forum v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d at 224-25. Eskridge writes that since 1981, “an increasing
number of states and cities ha[d] adopted laws affirmatively protecting gay people against
private discrimination and violence.” ESKRIDGE, supra note 6, at 139.
50. Louise Melling, Will We Sanction Discrimination?: Can “Heterosexuals Only” be
Among the Signs of Today?, 60 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 248, 253 (2013). What David
Bernstein said about the ACLU a decade ago remains true today: “[T]he ACLU has become
increasingly reluctant to defend civil liberties at the expense of antidiscrimination laws.”
BERNSTEIN, supra note 49, at 153. For example, in the cases discussed in PART II, the ACLU
has continuously refused to defend the religious liberty position. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Why
is the ACLU on the Wrong Side of the Wedding Photographer Case?, CATO INST. (Nov. 22,
2013) (Louise Melling said “the equal treatment of gay couples is more important than the
free speech rights of commercial photographers”), https://www.cato.org/blog/why-acluwrong-side-wedding-photographer-case; News Release, ACLU Seeks Remedies for Gay
Couple Discriminated Against Florist, ACLU (Apr. 10, 2013) (ACLU attorney Michael Scott
said: “when a business serves the general public, the business owner’s religious beliefs may
not be used to justify discrimination”), https://www.aclu-wa.org/news/aclu-seeks-remediesgay-couple-discriminated-against-florist. Louise Melling summarizes the ACLU’s position
on which civil liberties issues it will defend well when she says that “Free exercise to religion
gives us a right to our beliefs, but it doesn’t give us the right to harm others, doesn’t give us
the right to impose our views on others, it doesn’t give us the right to discriminate.” Cheryl
Wetzstein, Civil rights groups blast religious liberty acts, WASHINGTON TIMES (Mar. 17, 2015),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/17/aclu-blasts-religious-liberty-acts-aslicenses-to-/. Despite all this, and many more examples can be provided (especially in
controversies over “reproductive rights”), the ACLU maintains that religious liberty is a
fundamental right and that they are a “national leader in the struggle for religious freedom.”
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With this background mind, Koppelman’s shift into the “GroupDisadvantage Theory” brings full circle the discussion of harm and the need
for antidiscrimination laws. From the perspective of the victim, no remedy
is available to end the condition of so-called invidious discrimination in the
past against African-Americans and now against gays51 without imposing
norms by social and legal decisions.52 By aligning the present-day
discrimination against the LGBT-community with the race-based
discrimination of the past, society is able to impose wholesale restrictions
on religious claimants—having become the heirs of the racists of old.53 That
is the approach from one side of the debate.
C. Status/Conduct Distinction
The central theme of this Article is a focus on status/conduct distinctions
in an effort to find room where First Amendment defenses can be invoked
without losing the LGBT-community in the process. While some continue
to operate under the assumption that the LGBT-community faces that same
type of historic, religious-based animosity on the basis of status not conduct
without clarification,54 others have offered helpful justifications. Professor
Kenji Yoshino, for example, while recognizing a difference in the stated
forms of discrimination between status and conduct, argues that the
modern form is merely a sub-species of the same historic species of bigotry
currently rooted in a form of “covering,” forcing homosexual identity to
comply with norms of heteronormativity.55 Picking up on this argument,

Religious Liberty, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/religious-liberty; The ACLU and
Freedom of Religion and Belief, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-and-freedomreligion-and-belief#_ednref1.
51. Cf. Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equality Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 128 n.67 (1977) (“[I]f we are told that today a period of perpetual
subordination is about to begin for another group, we should be as concerned with the status
of that group as we are with the blacks.”).
52. KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 78.
53. See William N. Eskridge, Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief,
and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 657, 664–705 (2011) (traces
religious use of the Bible to condemn blacks and homosexuals).
54. See, e.g., Melling, supra note 50, at 253 (2013) (“When it turns away a lesbian or gay
couple, the inn that advertises as a destination-wedding site, or the bridal shop that opens its
doors to the public, in effect posts a ‘Heterosexuals Only’ sign in its window.”).
55. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 21–22
(2006). Taking the shift from outright bans on gay expression to the “don’t ask, don’t tell”
that excludes on the basis of homosexual self-identity, Yoshino writes:
This shift thus appears to represent progress for gays—no longer will they be
excluded for their status, but only for their self-identification or conduct. Yet
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Professor Douglas Nejaime offers a defense for moving the debate away
from a focus on same-sex marriage and into the arena of antidiscrimination
laws with an emphasis on relational identity in considering “limited
religious exemptions.”56
Professor Michael Dorf further points out that arguments for and against
making a conduct/status distinction is merely an opportunistic tool given
the shifting application of its use since Bowers, where gay right advocates
argued that even if the state could criminalize certain conduct, it could not
do so based on sexual orientation identity.57 On the other side, those who
stood against expanding gay rights often refused to make the distinction
often made today by casting all same-sex identity in the lens of deviant
conduct.58
On the other hand, many have argued that the type of discrimination
faced by gay couples in the cases outlined in Section III does not amount to
the same invidious discrimination faced by the black community of old.
These cases have made efforts to properly distinguish the forms of
discrimination by engaging in explanatory line drawing for the sake of
protecting competing liberal values. While I deal with this extensively
throughout the Article, one individual is worth mentioning at this point is
Nathan A. Berkeley, who, while working for the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security as a policy analyst, provided an approach that shines a
much needed light on the debate. He begins dealing with this controversy
this shift has not improved the material or dignitary conditions of gays in the
military, as homosexual self-identification and homosexual conduct are
sufficiently central to gay identity that burdening such acts is tantamount to
burdening gay status.
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 778 (2002). Another example of this comes from
Texas, where Big Earl's Bait House and Country Store refused to serve a gay couple, not
because they were gay, but because they failed to conform to a pre-assigned norm for
manliness. Courtney, supra note 32, at 1498–99. The author compares the motivation of Big
Earl with the artistic services discussed throughout this article. Id. at 1518. I make the
distinction in Section V.
56. Douglas Nejaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious
Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169,
1236–37 (2012).
57. Dorf, supra note 14, at 1313.
58. Id. (“[O]pponents of gay rights denied that the conduct/status distinction had
normative force.”); Eskridge, supra note 53, at 685–705. In one sense, the difficult issue is
whether both sides can come to a compromise as to what degree a person’s conduct makes
up that person’s very identity. Where Christians do not consider that marriage or intercourse
defines an individual having the luxury of enjoying these benefits without threat of
government reprisal, the LGBT community has not and may very well consider those rights
the very fabric of their being.
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by first asking whether legitimate civil rights are, in fact, being violated,
versus only the perception being driven by calculated references to the civilrights movement in an effort to gain the moral high ground.59 In his
analysis, he is keen to distinguish areas of constitutional violations (whether
due process or equal protection) where the state is rightfully responsible to
step in (i.e., those linked to targeted invidious discrimination against
“discrete, immutable attributes”) versus those ideological disagreements on
human sexuality,60 which requires the state to remain neutral.61 He argues
that when the state brings charges against defendants in an effort to uphold
its antidiscrimination laws, they are in essence asking the courts to violate
the stated principles in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Lawrence v.
Texas—that it is the role of the courts to “define the liberty of all, not to
mandate [its] own moral code.”62 With this in mind, Berkeley frames the
issue fundamentally differently from Louise Melling by asking this: “Why
should the majority be permitted to ‘use the power of the State’ via public
accommodation laws, nondiscrimination laws, or other applications of due
process or equal protection principles, to enforce the moral view that samesex sexual conduct must be accepted?”63
Between Melling’s framing of the issue and the one offered by Berkeley,
we have, what seems to be, an irreconcilable conflict. While creating much
needed change for the black and LGBT-community by rightfully ridding
invidious discrimination in various fields, antidiscrimination laws have also

59. Nathan A. Berkeley, Religious Freedom and LGBT Rights: Trading Zero Sum
Approaches for Careful Distinctions and Genuine Pluralism, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (20142015).
60. Id. at 14–15. Berkeley notes that “refusing to affirm sexual expressions and
associated relational forms, or forms of gender identity that may reduce human maleness
and femaleness to matters of individual autonomy, are not prima facie offenses against
human dignity and may be rooted in genuine religious convictions.” Id. at 15; see also
Garnett, supra note 2, at 81 (“Discrimination is wrong when it denies or is intended to deny
the equal dignity of every person . . . . [S]ometimes discrimination does this and sometimes it
doesn't.”).
61. See Berkeley, supra note 59, at 17 (“[W]hen government includes the behavior
dimension of sexual orientation in its efforts to enforce nondiscrimination laws, it is
misguided.”).
62. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003). “The [Supreme] Court made
abundantly clear that neither state nor federal criminal law might be used to express
majoritarian views on human sexuality and related sexual relationships and lifestyles . . . .”
Berkeley, supra note 59, at 21. As Garnett prudently advises, “[C]ourts, officials, and
governments should acknowledge and accept their limited competence and prerogative to
resolve authoritatively these disagreements.” Garnett, supra note 2, at 84.
63. Berkeley, supra note 59, at 22.
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come with great perils to our social structure.64 While I fully acknowledge
that religious claimants, at times, must “be required to sacrifice for the
public good,” that burden must remain “no greater than is necessary for
achievement of that good and may not be imposed disproportionately on
the religious.”65 Whatever the decision a business makes in the context of
refusing to serve the LGBT-community, laws imposing penalties will only
compound the likely reputational cost that comes with objecting.66
As a final note, it is also important for those appealing to the right to
exclude gays (regardless of intent) to know that from a historical
standpoint, their claims are largely rooted in an “artifact of the Jim Crow
era,” and not in a proper common law understanding of a duty to serve the
public. 67 While this is not reason for capitulating, it is something that
academics will use in the wider debate. While this Article does not go far
enough in creating a rubric to instigate such changes to help my gay
neighbor, I fully support those agencies that do and hope in the future to
lend my support as a Christian.68 For now, we turn to the relevant cases
where the refusal of service issues takes center stage.
III. THE NON-DISTINCTION APPROACH
A number of important controversies have surfaced in the last five years
that help illustrate the conflict between the religious and gay communities.

64. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 49 (laying a foundation of forced equality
principles pursuant largely to the Fourteenth Amendment and the dangers it created for civil
liberties).
65. Michael W. McConnell, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 47 (1989).
66. Wilson, supra note 5, at 167. Richard Epstein likewise “favors allowing religious
business owners or actors to act using their own discretion and to absorb the reputational
stigma that may come from refusing services based on religious beliefs.” Mimi Teixeira,
Richard Epstein on conflict between anti-discrimination laws and religious freedom, ACTON
INST. (July 25, 2016), http://blog.acton.org/archives/88222-richard-epstein-on-conflictbetween-anti-discrimination-laws-and-religious-freedom.html.
67. See James M. Donovan, Half-Baked: The Demand by For-Profit Businesses for
Religious Exemptions from Selling to Same-Sex Couples, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39, 51–60 (2016)
(“asserted right to exclude . . . emerged only as a proxy for slavery so as to maintain
domination over African Americans after the . . . Civil War”); Singer, supra note 42, at 1294
(“narrow range of businesses with duties to serve the public under both current common law
and the 1964 federal statute do not reflect the common law as it has existed from time
immemorial”).
68. William Eskridge wisely notes (while I disagree with his model for this) that religion
bears a role in “both confronting discriminatory policies endorsed by religions and
accommodating the faithful where possible.”). Eskridge, supra note 53, at 664.
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In these opinions, one finds the application of the “non-distinction”
approach where courts conflate the difference between invidious
discrimination and refusals to serve the LGBT-community based solely on
considering the service to be an endorsement of an underlying conduct
deemed sinful.
A. Elane Photography
Among the first legal opinions that tackles the issue of public
accommodations refusing to serve certain members of the LGBTcommunity comes from New Mexico, where the state’s highest court
examined an alleged violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act
(“NMHRA”) by the owner of Elane Photography, who refused to
photograph a commitment ceremony between a lesbian couple. The owner
of Elane Photography argued that compliance would convey a message of
endorsement in violation of her religious beliefs against gay marriage.69 The
court applied the non-distinction approach by equating the owner’s refusal
to photograph the lesbian couple’s commitment ceremony on par with a
hypothetical refusal to photograph an interracial couple.70
In justifying this approach, the court built on the difficulty of
distinguishing between status and conduct since the conduct at issue is “so
closely correlated with sexual orientation” that it would severely undermine
the purpose of the law.71 The court cited in support the Supreme Court’s
decision in CLS v. Martinez, which likewise “rejected similar attempts
distinguish between a protected status and conduct closely correlated with
that status.”72 In short, the conflation between status and conduct was the

69. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58–59, 61 (N.M. 2013). The
language of the Human Rights Act reads broadly to proscribed any discrimination whether
or not it was done “directly or indirectly.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(F) (2008). “Elane
Photography argues that it would have taken portrait photographs and performed other
services for same-sex customers, so long as they did not request photographs that involved
or endorsed same-sex weddings.” Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 61. To Elane, in the process
of creating and editing the photos, she was creating a “positive story about each wedding . . .
and the company and its owners would prefer not to send a positive message about same-sex
weddings or same-sex marriage.” Id. at 63.
70. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 59.
71. Id. at 61.
72. Id. (citing Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010)). In CLS, the
Court referred to Lawrence v. Texas, regarding the criminalization of sodomy as an example
of conduct closely correlated with being homosexual, and to Bray v. Alexandria Women’s
Health, providing an illustration where “a tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.”
Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. at 689 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003);
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product of what the court understood to be an inextricable relationship
between a person’s public commitment to another person of the same-sex
and that person’s identity as a homosexual.73
As a corollary to this non-distinction approach, any free speech defenses
are colored by the underlying conflation and are, therefore, non-viable. The
court, in this case, rejected a compelled speech argument despite conceding
that photography may very well involve an artistic service—even conveying
the client’s own personal message—but this was irrelevant since the plaintiff
in Elane Photography chose her line of business.74 If she wanted to escape
liability under the NMHRA, she could have ceased offering her services to
the public at large.75 As long as she remained open to the public, she had to
serve all76 customers.
B. Arlene’s Flowers
A second case goes much deeper into understanding the mindset or
intent factor of business owner’s refusal to serve.
This case involves Barronelle Stutzman, who (along with her husband)
owned and operated Arlene’s Flowers—a closely-held, for-profit
corporation.77 Mrs. Stutzman’s work revolved around creating floral
arrangement for special occasions, including weddings.78 She considered
this an artistic service,79 representing her unique talents and creativity.80 She
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993)). These reliance verses
will be dealt with in Section V.
73. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 62.
74. Id. at 66.
75. Id. at 67.
76. By “all” the court means all those within a protected category, i.e. “race, sex, sexual
orientation, or other protected classification.” Id. at 72. The opinion for example said that an
Africa-American does not have to offer service to members of the KKK because group
membership is not a protected category—the reverse is not true since race is part of a
protected category. Id.
77. State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 2015 WL 720213, at *3 (Wash. Super. 2015)
[hereinafter Arlene’s Flowers].
78. Id.
79. See Barronelle Stutzman, I’m a florist, but I refused to do flowers for my gay friend’s
POST
(May
12,
2015),
wedding,
WASHINGTON
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/128/im-a-florist-but-irefused-to-do-flowers-for-my-gay-friends-wedding/ [hereinafter Stutzman WAPO].
80. Brief of Appellants at 7, State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, (No. 91615-2),
2015 WL 720213, at *1 (Wash. Super. 2015) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants]; see also Motion
for Leave to File Brief and Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellants, at 5–7, State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, (No. 91615-2), 2015 WL 720213,
at *1 (Wash. Super. 2015) (offering evidence how florists engage in artistic services).
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had never expressed nor harbored animus toward the gay couple bringing
this suit against her (Ingersoll and Freed, collectively: “Plaintiffs”), nor any
other members of the LGBTQ+ community.81 Mrs. Stutzman has served the
Plaintiffs “on nearly 30 previous occasions and referred them [elsewhere]
for only one event due to her sincere religious beliefs.”82
As a Christian, Mrs. Stutzman believes that endorsing or participating83
in a same-sex wedding goes against the clear teaching of Scripture and she
believes that lending her artistic talents to such a celebration would amount
to an act of endorsement.84 While she felt “terrible” that she could not share
in the Plaintiff’s joy of being married, for her, it was never about the sexual
orientation of the individual, but about the message she felt she was being
asked to convey.85 As the Superior Court acknowledged, Mrs. Stutzman was
simply following the teachings of the Southern Baptist Convention that
balances the need to uphold a traditional view on marriage while retaining a
loving attitude towards those who struggle with same-sex attraction.86 Mrs.
Stutzman offered the names of other florists who she knew would do a good
job, which cost the Plaintiff’s $7.91 in out-of-pocket expenses.87
After Mrs. Stutzman refused to provide her services, and after she
refused to comply with a statement ensuring that her conduct at issue
would not be repeated, this lawsuit was filed.88 The State of Washington
81. Brief of Appellants, supra note 80, at 9, 32.
82. Id. at 2; see also Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *3 (“Stutzman had served [the
plaintiff] approximately 20 times or more and that he had spent in the range of $4,500 at
Arlene’s Flowers.”).
83. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *3.
84. Id. The Superior Court acknowledged that Mrs. Stutzman “draws a distinction
between the provision of raw materials . . . and the provision of flower arrangements that she
has herself arranged [for the wedding].” Id.
85. Stutzman WAPO, supra note 79.
86. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *3. Any forms of “gay-bashing, disrespectful
attitudes, hateful rhetoric, or hate-incited actions” toward the LGBT community is explicitly
condemned. Id. at 3 n.7. This sentiment is echoed throughout the Christian community. See,
e.g., Nick Roen, Homophobia Has No Place in the Church, DESIRING GOD (Mar. 29, 2016),
http://www.desiringgod.org/articles/homophobia-has-no-place-in-the-church (noting the
fear that homophobia is all too common inside the church and urges Christians to operate in
love. RUSSELL MOORE, ONWARD: ENGAGING THE CULTURE WITHOUT LOSING THE GOSPEL 182–
83 (2015) (calling on Christians to love and serve gay and lesbian neighbors and to reject
those voices that try to intimidate them).
87. Stutzman WAPO, supra note 79; Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *4.
88. Lornet Turnbull, State’s Case Against Florist Fires Up Gay-Marriage Critics, SEATTLE
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/statersquos-case-againstflorist-fires-up-gay-marriage-critics/. The Attorney General did seek, prior to the lawsuit, for
Mrs. Stutzman to “sign an Assurance of Discontinuance . . . , stipulating that the conduct at
issue here occurred and would not be repeated.” Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *5.
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heard about the conflict through the media and the Plaintiffs only joined
the fray nine days after the State filed its lawsuit.89 The challenge asserted
that Mrs. Stutzman violated the Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) by
engaging in “unfair or deceptive act or practice”90 and the Washington Law
Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) in refusing to accommodate the
Plaintiffs’ request. Both statutes were read liberally per instruction of the
state legislature. The former required a lesser showing if the attorney
general brings charges and the latter allowed for a violation to occur if the
discrimination was either direct or indirect.91
In relation to the issue of conflating conduct and identity, Mrs. Stutzman
argued for the Court to make a distinction between the conduct of the
Plaintiffs in being married and their identity as homosexual.92 However, the
Court rejected this attempt by citing to the Supreme Court and asserting
that “the extent to which religious motivation may provide an affirmative
defense . . . is irrelevant under both the CPA and WLAD.”93 Looking to Bob
Jones v. United States, the Superior Court asserted the Supreme Court “has
long held that discrimination based on conduct associated with a protected
characteristic constitutes discrimination on the basis of that
characteristic.”94 Mrs. Stutzman’s refusal to “do the flowers” on the basis of
89. Brief of Appellants, supra note 80, at 13-14; Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *5.
90. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *5 (case brought by the Attorney General).
91. Id. The relevant language from the statute prohibited discrimination as follows:
It shall be an unfair practice for any person or the person's agent or employee
to commit an act which directly or indirectly results in any distinction,
restriction, or discrimination . . . or the refusing or withholding from any
person the admission, patronage, custom, presence, frequenting, dwelling,
staying, or lodging in any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage,
or amusement, except for conditions and limitations established by law and
applicable to all persons, regardless of race, creed, color, national origin, sexual
orientation . . . .
RCW § 49.60.215(1) (West 2011). Interestingly, Mrs. Stutzman tried to argue that the lawsuit
was moot and that its momentum was largely due to a misunderstanding. Arlene's Flowers,
2015 WL 720213, at *9. According to Mrs. Stutzman, had she known that all the Plaintiffs
wanted was raw materials, instead of flower arrangements, for the wedding, she of gladly
complied. Id. The Court was not persuaded. Id. at *13.
92. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *13.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *15 (citing Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983)).
The court also cited Christian Legal Society, 561 U.S. at 689 (2010) as another instance where
the Supreme Court refused to distinguish between status and conduct in the context of a
university student group rejecting gay members. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *16.
The Court asserted that there existed no authority for the “proposition that substantial
compliance with discrimination laws excuses any individual act of discrimination.” Id.
(citing Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 62 (N.M. 2013)).
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her religious opposition to same sex marriage, was for the Court—as a
matter of law—a refusal based on the sexual orientation of the couple.95
This conflation was made easy given that the language of the WLAD
explicitly disallowed making “any distinction, restriction, or
discrimination” based on a protected class.96
On the free speech issue in response to the non-distinction approach, the
Court refused to acknowledge that any persuasive authority existed to
justify an exemption from the state’s antidiscrimination provision.97 The
justification was clear. Since the Supreme Court forbids racial
discrimination in employment, and since the Court in Rumsfeld v. FAIR
made clear that the “abridgment of freedom of speech” cannot be made a
reason to disallow the illegality of certain conduct simply because that
conduct was “initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language,”
Mrs. Stutzman’s appeal to the Frist Amendment was untenable.98
The Washington Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the court of
appeals, continuing to base its decision largely on the non-distinction
approach on the constitutional issue.99 The Court noted that numerous
courts have rejected the status/conduct distinction, pointing out that the
decision in Obergefell made clear that “the denial of marriage equality to
same-sex couples [was] itself [akin] to discrimination.”100 On the question
of compelled speech, the Court refused to acknowledge that Mrs. Stutzman,

95. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *15.
96. Id. at *15 n.18 (citing RCW 49.60.215(1) (West 2011)). As a matter of what appears
to be pure formalism, the Court determined that since Mrs. Stutzman admitted to the
underlying “conduct that constitutes a violation of the statute,” and since the Court refused
to make any distinctions proposed by Mrs. Stutzman in order to assert First Amendment
defense, nothing remained to remove her conduct from the statutes intended purpose.
Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *16. It seemed that even if the Court allowed an inquiry
framed in terms of making the necessary distinction between conduct and identity, the
language of the statute in disallowing indirect discriminatory results would still require the
same outcome. Id. at *18.
97. Id. at *20 (citing Elane Photography, 309 P. 3d at 72)).
98. Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
62 (2006)). The Court likewise struck down a freedom of association defense by citing
Supreme Court precedent that removes “[i]nvidious private discrimination” from
constitutional protection. Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *22 (quoting Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)).
99. State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 553, 568 (Wash. 2017).
The court agreed that if the state statute violated constitutional rights, the latter would
prevail. Id. at 556.
100. Id. at 553.
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by providing flowers for the wedding, bore the markings of an “inherent[]
expressi[on]” that viewers would understand without further explanation.101
C. Sweetcakes by Melissa
The same non-distinction approach was present when the Commissioner
of the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries (“BOLI”), Brad Avakian,
upheld a $135,000 fine on the Klein Family for refusing to sell a cake to a
lesbian couple.102 The facts are largely the same as in the previous two cases.
Here, the gay couple, anticipating a same-sex ceremony, sought out the
services of the Klein Family to make a wedding cake.103 After the Kleins
discovered that the cake was intended for a same-sex ceremony, they
declined to complete the request, citing to their religious convictions.104
Afterward, a complaint was filed with the Oregon Department of Justice,
where the Kleins were accused of calling the gay couple an “abomination[]
unto the lord” and allegedly claiming that the couple’s money was “not
equal.”105 Several months later, a complaint was filed with BOLI alleging
that Sweetcakes by Melissa had discriminated against the couple on the
basis of their sexual orientation.
The violation itself involved not simply the refusal to sell, but also a
communicated intent to discriminate in the future based on sexual
orientation.106 As the Commissioner found, the interviews and the note left
101. Id. at 557. As the court pointed out: “The decision to either provide or reuse to
provide flowers for a wedding does not inherently express a message about that wedding.”
Id.
102. Melissa Elaine Klein, 34 BOLI 102 (2015), 2015 WL 4868796, at *23, available at
http://www.oregon.gov/boli/SiteAssets/pages/press/Sweet%20Cakes%20FO.pdf [hereinafter
BOLI FINAL ORDER].
103. Id. at *3.
104. Id. When the Kleins refused to complete the order, only one of the lesbians was
present. During this exchange, the record indicates that the Kleins had cited to Leviticus
18:22 (i.e., “you shall not lie with a male as one lies with a female; it is an abomination”)
among the reasons why they could not comply with the request. Id. Upon hearing this, one
of the lesbians felt that the denial of service signified that she was a “creature not created by
God, not created with a soul” and that she was “unworthy of holy love . . . [and] not worthy
of life.” Id. at *4.
105. Melissa Elaine Klein, 34 BOLI 102 (2015), 2015 WL 4868796, at *6.
106. Id. at *16. The statute made it an unlawful practice to “publish, circulate, issue or
display . . . any communication, notice, advertisement or sign” that signified any intent to
discriminate against any person based on their sexual orientation. Id. at *14 (citing ORS §
659A.409 (West 2016)). Note that the Commissioner struck down a constitutional challenge
to ORS § 659A.409 as a speech code, alleging that it only applies “to the business of a place of
public accommodation” and not to an individual’s “personal opinion, political commentary,
or other privileged communication.” Id. at *18. Whether this means that no public
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outside the Sweetcakes business constituted a “clear intent to discriminate
in the future just as they had done [in the past].”107 Further, looking to the
antidiscrimination public accommodation laws, the Commissioner,
developing the laws origins as an effort to rid the public of racial
discrimination, framed this “case . . . not [being] about a wedding cake or a
marriage . . . [but] about a business’s refusal to serve someone because of
their sexual orientation.”108 The Commissioner went on by stating that the
forum has already denied any distinction between denying service on the
basis of sexual orientation and on the basis of not wishing to participate in a
same-sex wedding.109 Furthermore, the Commissioner went on to indict the
Kleins for their “clear and direct statement” that the lesbian couple “lacked
an identity worthy of being recognized . . . . [an act that] devalues the
humanity of us all.”110 The Kleins were fined $135,000—not to punish them,
but to make the lesbian couple whole.111 This case is currently on appeal to
the Oregon Supreme Court.112
accommodation can ever convey an expressive service thus enjoying the protections of the
First Amendment is uncertain.
107. Id. at *16.
108. Melissa Elaine Klein, 34 BOLI 102 (2015), 2015 WL 4868796, at *19.
109. Id. The reason provided in the Appendix quotes the same sections from CLS v.
Martinez and Elane Photography, refusing to make any distinctions and stating that a
marriage ceremony is inextricably connected to a person’s sexual orientation. Id. at *52.
110. Id. at *19.
111. Melissa Elaine Klein, 34 BOLI 102 (2015), 2015 WL 4868796, at *23-4. The
Commissioner seemed to have arrived at these figures based on the “extent and severity” of
the emotional suffering exhibited by the lesbian couple. Id. at *23. Despite the better
judgment of Judge Kethledge, to me, this case is based on “ridiculous” arguments. See
Bennett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 584, 584 (6th Cir. 2013). As Andrew
Koppelman rightly pointed out, “the Oregon Labor Commissioner's finding of liability and
the extraordinarily large damage award were crafted with no evident awareness that there
was any free speech issue” and shows how local decision makers can abuse their position.
Koppelman, supra note 21, at 1155–56, 1159. Perhaps the Oregon Commissioner could be
among the rare examples sought out by Peter J. Smith of those judges drive entirely by
ignorance. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1481 (2007). With Brad
Avakian’s record and affiliation with gay rights advocacy groups during the case
deliberation, it perhaps time for him to heed the advice of Judge Posner and admit that his
decision was politically driven. Id. at 1482 n.233 (“Posner . . . has argued that that judges
should stop deluding themselves into believing that they do not act politically . . . .”); Kelsey
Harkness, Emails Raise Questions of Bias in Case Against Bakers Who Denied Services for
Same-Sex Wedding, Daily Signal (June 1, 2015), http://dailysignal.com/2015/06/01/emailsraise-questions-of-bias-in-case-against-bakers-who-denied-service-for-same-sex-wedding/;
Adam Andrzejewski, Brad Avakian’s Political Hacking of the Oregon Bureau of Labor and
(Oct.
24,
2016),
Industry,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamandrzejewski/2016/10/24/brad-avakians-politicalhacking-of-the-oregon-bureau-of-labor-and-industry/#150366f11935; see also Richard A.
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D. Masterpiece Bakery
In another similar case, this one out of Colorado, the state court of
appeals upheld the Colorado Civil Rights Commission ruling in favor of a
gay couple who was denied their request for Masterpiece Cakeshop to
“design and create a [wedding] cake to celebrate their same-sex wedding.”113
According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the owner, Jack C.
Phillips, could not comply with this request because he believed that
“decorating cakes is a form of art . . . and that he would displease God by
[acquiescing].”114 The couple filed charges of discrimination based on sexual
orientation under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (“CADA”).115 The
ALJ found in favor of the couple, and ordered a “cease and desist” requiring
Masterpiece to take remedial measures to ensure compliance with the
CADA and to file quarterly reports for two years indicating what measures
were taken in compliance and if any other patrons were denied service.116
Interestingly, this decision came even after the ALJ acknowledged that
creating a wedding cake required “considerable skill and artistry;” however,
the “finished product” did not constitute protected speech under the First
Amendment.117
Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 865 (1988) (“By pulling the
wool over the public's eyes, the pretense of certitude and neutrality may strengthen the
political position of the courts in our society, and maybe that is a good thing—or maybe
not.”).
112. Maxine Bernstein, Owners of Sweet Cakes file appeal with Oregon Supreme Court,
OREGONIAN
(March.
2,
2018),
THE
http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2018/03/owners_of_sweet_cakes_file_app.ht
ml. The Oregon Court of Appeals tracked closely the common language used for the nondistinction approach. See Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor & Indus., 289 Or. App. 507, 523,
410 P.3d 1051, 1063 (2017) (“The Kleins refused to make a wedding cake for the
complainants precisely and expressly because of the relationship between sexual orientation
and the conduct at issue (a wedding). And, where a close relationship between status and
conduct exists, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the type of distinction urged by
the Kleins.”).
113. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015).
114. Id. at 277.
115. Id. The law was read broadly to prohibit any “direct[] or indirect[]” discrimination
in the public accommodation setting. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (West
2014).
116. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 277.
117. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. CR 2013-0008, at *7-8 (Colo. Civil Rights
Comm'n Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/MasterpieceDecision.pdf, aff'd, No.
CR
2013-0008
(Colo.
Civil
Rights
Comm'n
May
30,
2014),
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/MasterpieceFinalAgencyOrder.pdf, aff'd, 2015 COA 115
(Colo. App. Aug. 13, 2015).
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The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the ALJ—and, in
doing so, applied the non-distinction approach adopted in the prior three
cases. The court correctly pointed out that the issue with designing the cake
for Jack Phillips was an issue with the celebratory message conveyed in
baking a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.118 It was never about the
individual’s sexual orientation, and in fact, Jack Phillips readily agreed to
sell them any other bakery product.119 In response, the Court of Appeals,
like the previous three decisions, cited the same language from Martinez,
Lawrence, and Bob Jones—as well as citing to the recent same-sex marriage
decision in Obergefell for the proposition that the “Supreme Court equated
laws precluding same-sex marriage to discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.”120 In essence, certain same-sex conduct is so “closely
correlated” with the underlying sexual orientation status that to deny one is
to deny the other.121 This was based on the fact that “the act of same-sex
marriage constitutes such conduct because it is ‘engaged in exclusively or
predominately’ by gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.”122
Finally, the Court also dismissed the compelled speech123 argument,
contending (like the Supreme Court in Arlene’s Flowers) that the public
would not associate the selling of goods with an endorsement of same-sex
marriage.124 While this may be true, it is more likely a failure to
acknowledge the broader culture125 and the ability of certain acts to be

118. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 280.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 280–281 (citing in support Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2016)).
121. Id. at 281.
122. Id. The Court made this leap by allowing the presumption from Bray, which
declared that: although opposition to voluntary abortion does not equate to a discrimination
against woman, “[s]ome activities may be such an irrational object of disfavor that, if they are
targeted, and if they also happen to be engaged in exclusively or predominately by a
particular class of people, an intent to disfavor that class can readily be presumed.” Id. at 282
(citing Bray, 506 U.S. at 270) (emphasis added). The court offers the example that a “tax on
wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.” Bray, 506 U.S. at 270. Under this logic, it is hard to
explain how opposition to abortion does not “discriminate” against women since women are
clearly the particular class who engages “exclusively or predominately” in that conduct.
What seems to be happening is that the court is willing to recognize an ideological agenda
when it comes to opposing abortion (instead of it being solely based on sexism), but refuses
to extend this logic in instances involving the LGBT-community.
123. See id. at 288 (“order requiring Masterpiece not to discriminate against potential
customers because of their sexual orientation does not force it to engage in compelled
expressive conduct”).
124. Id. at 287.
125. Clashes involving the LGBT and religious community have become widely
publicized. See, e.g., Ahiza Garcia, Georgia, N.C. and beyond: What you need to know about
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imbued with expressive association.126 Justice Thurgood Marshall explained
this well when he illustrated that the act of sleeping and sitting—although
typically non-expressive—can become a “novel mode of communication” if
done in a given context.127 In the current American culture, the freedom of
association has provided a vehicle for public figures like Bruce
Springsteen,128 Bryan Adams, 129 Tracy Morgan,130 and others131 to stand
together against perceived discrimination toward the LGBTQ+
community.132 On the other hand, small businesses that refused to cater

the
clash
over
'anti-gay'
bills,
CNN
MONEY
(Mar.
26,
2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/26/news/anti-lgbt-bills-north-carolina-georgia/; Zack Ford,
Indiana And South Dakota Kick Off Backlash Against LGBT Rights, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 28,
2016),
http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2016/01/28/3743668/indiana-south-dakotadiscrimination-bills/.
126. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 304-05 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 306; Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 139 (1966). Cf. Caroline Mala Corbin,
Speech of Conduct? The Free Speech Claims of Wedding Vendors, 65 EMORY L.J. 241, 265–74
(2015) (discusses that context can create expressive meaning); Dale Carpenter, Expressive
Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1515, 1556 (2001) (under a message-based approach, with the backdrop of “loud,
continuous, and insistent demands to discuss and take sides on gay-rights claims, a steadfast
refusal to talk at all about the issue is hardly neutral.”).
128. Ben Sisario, Bruce Springsteen Cancels North Carolina Concert Over Bias Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/09/business/media/brucespringsteen-cancels-a-north-carolina-concert-over-anti-gay-law.html?_r=0.
129. Nigel M. Smith, Bryan Adams Cancels Mississippi Tour Date in Protest Over Anti(Apr.
11,
2016),
LGBT
Law,
GUARDIAN
http://www.theguardian.com/music/2016/apr/11/bryan-adams-cancels-mississippi-tourdate-protest-of-anti-lgbt-law.
130. Brittany Spanos, Tracy Morgan Cancels Mississippi Performance Over Religious
STONES
(Apr.
19,
2016),
Accommodations
Act,
ROLLING
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/tracy-morgan-cancels-mississippi-performance20160419.
131. Daniel Nussbaum, 30 Hollywood Power Players Join George Boycott Over Religious
(Mar.
24,
2016),
http://www.breitbart.com/bigFreedom
Bill,
BREITBART
hollywood/2016/03/24/lee-daniels-anne-hathaway-rob-reiner-and-more-join-georgiaboycott-over-religious-freedom-bill/.
132. Recently the National Basketball Association (NBA) decided to move the All-Star
game from Charlotte in protest to the State’s bathroom laws deemed discriminatory towards
the transgendered public. Scott Cacciola, N.B.A. to Move All-Star Game From North
TIMES
(July
21,
2016),
Carolina,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/sports/basketball/nba-all-star-game-moves-charlottetransgender-bathroom-law.html.
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same-sex weddings are often associated with the message of the “religious
right,”133 and branded as being “bigots”134 for their alleged discrimination.
For those reasons, the dissenting members in the case were correct in
wanting to grant the appeal to determine whether the CADA required Jack
Phillips to violate his rights under the First Amendment—an issue shortly
to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.135
E. Outliers
Interestingly, the Colorado Court of Appeals did admit that a wedding
cake could have a particularized message sufficient to trigger First
133. See Leslie Dorrough Smith, Beyond Religious Right and Secular Left Rhetoric: The
Road to Compromise, J. OF CHURCH & STATE 57.4, at 801–03 (2015).
134. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 17; Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on
the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 260, 267–69 (2010); see also
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (holding opposing views can be “based on
decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises”). As rightly noted by Professor
Carol A. Ball of Rutgers, it is false to label unequivocally “all business owners who refuse on
religious grounds to provide goods and services to same-sex couples [as bigots],” especially if
that owner (like Barronelle Stutzman) is otherwise willing to serve the gay couple in a
different context (i.e. request). Ball, supra note 17, at 644. In the Oral Argument before the
Supreme Court, the lawyer for the Petitioner advocating to legalize same-sex marriage failed
to answer the question as to whether everyone who held to traditional views on marriage
intended to “demean gay people” as the Michigan law holding to traditional marriage
allegedly did. The exchange is memorable for its probing qualities—if not for the Plaintiff’s
famous “times can blind” response likely lifted from Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence v. Texas
majority. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-17, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (No. 14-556), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
14-556q1_l5gm.pdf; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (“[T]hose who drew
and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”); see also Obergefell,
135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Robert, J., dissenting) (“[T]o blind yourself to history is both prideful and
unwise.”). Again, from Professor Ball: “In theory, it is possible to defend a traditional
understanding of marriage without making moral judgments regarding characteristics,
attributes, and values of same-sex relationships.” Ball, supra note 17, at 654. I suspect that for
many Christians, rejecting homosexual conduct is inextricably connected with moral
judgment—not as to the actor, however, but certainly as to the act—this much Professor Ball
acknowledged throughout her article. See id. at 655, 660; see also Matthew J. Franck,
Introduction to RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS 1–6 (Timothy S. Shah, Thomas F. Farr,
Jack Friedman eds. 2016) (discussing the conception of sexual ethics as part of Christian
humanism).
135. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, No. 15SC738, 2016
WL 1645027, at *1 (Colo. Apr. 25, 2016). The significance of the Supreme Court’s pending
decision cannot be overstated in the wider ramifications it has on related faith/equality
issues. See generally Anton Sorkin, A Starch Reality 7(1) OXFORD J. OF L. & RELIGION (2018).
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Amendment speech protections.136 An example of this took place the year
before Masterpiece Cakeshop when the Colorado Department of Regulatory
Agencies upheld the right of baker to refuse to design a cake that contained
content disparaging same-sex marriage.137 This case involved a customer
who requested that Azucar Bakery (specifically, the Pastry Chef Lindsay
Jones) design two cakes, one depicting a gay couple holding hands with a
red “X” marked over the image and the other including various Bible verses
about God’s hate for sin and forgiveness of sinners.138 The Bakery refused to
comply because it viewed the “verses as discriminatory” and maintaining
that all requests deemed “offensive” or “hateful” would be refused,
regardless of religion.139
The decision turned on a four-element test for discriminatory denial of
equal treatment, the customer having met the first three,140 but failed the
fourth, which stated that “the Charging Party was treated differently by the
Respondent than other individuals not of his/her protected class.”141 The
Colorado Department acknowledged that the Respondent’s denial was
based on the explicit message that the customer wished to include and the
seller’s concern that the message was discriminatory.142 While the customer
alleged that he was treated differently than non-Christians, the Department
found no evidence supporting this conclusion.143 In short, the Department
asserted that as long as the Bakery refuses all similar requests without
reference to the customer’s status (i.e., protected class),144 it is not violating
the state’s antidiscrimination laws. Lest we consider this an aberration, the

136. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 288 (Colo. App. 2015).
137. Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Mar. 24,
2015)
[hereinafter
“Azucar
Bakery”],
available
at
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/AzucarDecision.pdf. The Azucar Bakery decision was marked
to be “[o]n behalf of the Colorado Civil Rights Division,” which was the same agency that
ruled against Masterpiece Bakery. Id. at 5; Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 276.
138. Azucar Bakery, supra note 137, at 2. Among the verses include: “God hates sin,”
“Homosexuality is a detestable sin,” and “While we were yet sinners Christ died for us.” Id.
139. Id. at 1-2.
140. Namely: (1) the Charging Party is a member of a protected class; (2) the Charging
Party sought the goods and services of the Respondent; (3) the Charging Party is otherwise a
qualified recipient of the goods and services of the Respondent. Id. at 3-4.
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The Department noted that “[u]nlawful discrimination” is primarily based on a
person’s “asserted protected group or status.” Id. at 2. Further, the stated reason for denying
a request is a rebuttable presumption—evidence of pretext may be offered to show denial
was solely on the basis of that persons protected status. Id.
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Colorado Commission ruled likewise in two other cases brought by the
same charging party.145
In another outlier, the Kentucky Circuit Court reversed the decision
adopted by the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights
Commission (“Commission”), which held that Hands On Original
(“HOO”) discriminated against the Gay and Lesbian Services Organization
(“GLSO”) in violation of the “Fairness Ordinance” when it refused to print
the official t-shirt for GLSO’s 2012 Pride Festival.146 As part of HOO’s
policy, any service that went to “endorse positions that conflict with the
convictions of the ownership” would be refused.147 Based on this policy,
HOO has denied at least thirteen orders over the past several years,
believing the designs to be “offensive contrary to their Christian beliefs or
otherwise inappropriate.”148
The Circuit Court found that in forcing HOO to print the shirts, the
Commissioner, as an agent of the government, compelled the printing
company to speak a message that it was constitutionally protected from
speaking.149 Where GLSO and the Commissioner intended to frame the
issue that HOO denied the request based on the sexual orientation of
GLSO’s members,150 the Court found that the real issue rests on the message
145. See Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Mar. 24,
2015), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/GateauxDecision.pdf; Jack v. Le Bakery
Sensual, Charge No. P20140070X (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Mar. 24, 2015), available at
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/LeBakerySensualDecision.pdf.
146. Hands On Originals, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights
Comm’n, Civil Action No. 14-CI-04474, at 2 (Circuit Court Third Division, April 27, 2015),
available at
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HandsOnOriginalsDecision.pdf.
147. Id. at 3. The understood endorsement in this case would be “that people should take
pride in sexual relationships or sexual activity outside of a marriage between a man and a
woman.” Id. at 6.
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id. at 9.
150. Lexington-Fayette County Human Rights Commission v. Hands On Originals, Inc.,
HRC
No.
03-12-3135
at
12,
16
(Oct.
6,
2014),
available
at
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HOOrecommendation.pdf. The confusion was whether HOO
refused to print the t-shirt because it didn't want to advocate pride in “being homosexual” or
because it didn't want to advocate pride in “sexual activity outside of a marriage between one
man and one woman.” Id. at 12; Hands on Originals, No. 14-CI-04474, at 9. The distinction
between rejecting the same-sex marriage versus the practice of sex outside of marriage is
significant because it allows Christian businesses to separate themselves from opposing
conduct “exclusively or predominantly” engaged in by a protected class, which most courts
find problematic, even in cases where the Christian owners win. See, e.g., Lexington Fayette
Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm'n v. Hands on Originals, Inc., No. 2015-CA-000745-MR,
2017 WL 2211381, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017).
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that GLSO intended to inscribe on the shirts, which went against HOO’s
sincerely held Christian beliefs.151 Where the Commissioner rejected a claim
that the Fairness Ordinance violates HOO’s First Amendment guarantees,
the Circuit Court, by avoiding the non-distinction approach, was able to
clearly differentiate the absence of evidence of sexual orientation
discrimination based on status and see that the real issue is centered around
the compelled message and forced association elements in violation of
Supreme Court precedent.152 If the Commissioner wants to infringe on
these First Amendment protections, it must offer a compelling reason to do
so.153
While these cases illustrate the opposing approaches in relatively similar
fact scenarios, this Article turns next to arguing that the non-distinction
approach is a legal fiction used to advance the interest of the court toward
some societal norm.
IV. LEGAL FICTIONS
Defining the concept of legal fictions is difficult for many reasons.154
Among those being that the classic formulation does not provide a
consensus approach155 and the so-called “new legal fiction” is surrounded
by a seeming obliviousness of its use156 or is at least marked by a profound
151. Hands on Originals, No. 14-CI-04474 at 10. The Court emphasized that the sexual
orientation of GLSO’s representatives who contacted HOO was never disclosed and that the
real issue was what the actual group endorsed through the Pride Festival. Id.
152. Id. at 10-13.
153. Id. at 15. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, connecting the
rejection to print t-shirts celebrating a certain choice of lifestyle, amounts to “viewpoint or
message censorship,” which the fairness ordinance allows. Lexington Fayette Urban Cty.
Human Rights Comm'n v. Hands on Originals, Inc., No. 2015-CA-000745-MR, 2017 WL
2211381, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017). In a more recent decision, the Superior Court of
California sided with a couple’s refusal to create a wedding cake to be used in celebration of a
same sex marriage. See Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Cathy’s Creations,
No.
BCV-17-102855
(Cal.
Super.
Ct.,
Feb.
05,
2018),
available
at
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4368433/Tastries-Ruling.pdf. The Court’s
holding rested on a refusal to pin the State’s interest in ensuring a freely accessible
marketplace above the First Amendment: “A wedding cake is not just a cake in a Free Speech
analysis. It is an artistic expression by the person making it that is to be used traditionally as
a centerpiece in the celebration of a marriage. There could not be a greater form of
expressive conduct.” Id. at *1, *4.
154. Douglas Lind, The Pragmatic Value of Legal Fictions, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 83, 85 (2015); LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 5 (1967).
155. See Smith, supra note 111, at 1465.
156. See id. at 1472 (“Sometimes judges rely on new legal fictions simply because they
believe them to be true.”). With “new legal fictions . . . there generally is no recognition of the
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lack of transparency.157 Other problems, more closely aligned with the
nature of the non-distinction approach, is the use of fictions as an
instrument for a judge to push for their own normative choices in
fashioning legal rules.158 In these instances, it makes sense why a judge
would want to avoid the appearance of using legal fictions instead of
established precedent.159
One of the more likely reasons why judges may turn to using legal
fictions in the cases above is the fear, expressed by the ACLU in Arlene’s
Flowers, involving a breakdown of antidiscrimination laws as a result of
accommodating religious claimants.160 This tracks close to what Professor J.
Smith refers to as the “legitimating function,” where the abandonment of
fictions could have “de-legitimating consequences.”161 This Section will
build on the various forms of fictions throughout history while arguing the
non-distinction approach falls comfortably among these uses; in particular,
the three forms discussed in Section B.

fact that the premise is false, although the assertions need not consciously be intended to
deceive.” Id. at 1470.
157. Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 19
(2010) (“[E]ither they are not acknowledged to be false or . . . they are not in fact
demonstrably false.”); Smith, supra note 111, at 1440 (a classic formulation of fictions did
not intend to deceive while new legal fictions involve a lack of candor).
158. See Smith, supra note 111, at 1441.
159. See JOHN BAKER, THE LAW’S TWO BODIES 33, 35, 37 (2001) (stating that the “essence
of a fiction that it leaves no explicit evidence of its existence”) [hereinafter “TWO BODIES”].
“[J]udges have actually held it a positive virtue to change the law by stealth.” Id. at 37; see also
Jeremiah Smith, Surviving Fictions, 27 YALE L. J. 147, 148–49 (1917) (stating that the “second
reason for the use of fiction . . . to conceal the fact that the judges, by their decisions, are
making or changing the substantive law.”); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 25
(Montagu ed., 1986) (defines legal fictions “to signify any assumption which conceals, or
affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration[s] . . . .”); Smith, supra
note 111, at 1437 (stating that “judges routinely relied on legal fictions to mask the effects of
legal change.”).
160. Brief of Respondents Ingersoll and Freed in Answer to Amicus Curiae Briefs, State of
Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers No. 91615-2, at 12 (2016) (stating that the there is “no
limiting principle that would prevent the kind of exemption sought here from swallowing
the rule”), available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A08/916152%20Resp.
%20Answer%20to%20Amicus.pdf.
161. Smith, supra note 111, at 1478. The purpose behind using fictions in this way is to
“produce legal rules with positive expressive value[s].” Id. at 1478 (emphasis added).
Ironically, while judges refuse to acknowledge the artistic expression in the above-mentioned
services, at the same time, they are using legal fictions as an instrument to advance their own
expressive positive values as part of the social transformation motif. See id. at 1480 (“If
nothing else, judges’ factual assumptions often reflect their aspirations for society and the
law.”).
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A. History
In attempting to define legal fictions, the starting point would have to be
in describing them as statements made in contrast with known or
discoverable facts.162 Throughout history, famed jurists and common law
lawyers invoked and renounced legal fictions for a multiplicity of reasons.
Eminent jurist Lon Fuller has described their use as a source of shame to the
law, while—at the same time—an indispensable part of its development.163
Sir Henry Maine echoed these sentiments, writing that the use of fictions
had a great purpose during the “infancy of society” to overcome the rigidity
of the law—but as society and law progressed, their usefulness decreased.164
Others have gone so far as to claim that “at bottom all law is reduced to a
series of fictions heaped upon another in successive layers.”165 Those who
support their use wisely point to those benefits that allow for judges to make
legal assumptions for the purpose of advancing justice when the law may
otherwise inflict some injury.166
This idea of creating positive change despite the need for a little sleight of
hand is a constant theme in the succeeding sections. While this Article takes
no categorical positions on the use of fictions, it does suggest its present
usage involving the cases in Section II to be ill advised. Before we get there,
it will be helpful to briefly trace the use of these “pampered children of the
law”167 throughout history to supplement any attempts at a definition.
1. Roman Law
The concept of legal fictions is an ancient instrument going back to the
days of the Roman Empire.168 During this time, fictions were used as forms
of pleadings, signifying a hurdle insurmountable for the defense.169 One
162. Id. at 1437.
163. Fuller, supra note 154, at 2.
164. MAINE, supra note 159, at 25. He notes in the context of the early “fiction of
adoption” that it would have been difficult to imagine “how society would ever have escaped
from its swaddling-clothes, and taken its first step towards civilization.” Id. at 26. “I cannot
admit any anomaly to be innocent, which makes the law either more difficult to understand
or harder to arrange in harmonious order.” Id. at 26.
165. PIERRE DE TOURTOULON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 387 (1922).
166. Sidney T. Miller, The Reasons for Some Legal Fictions, 8 MICHIGAN L. REV. 623
(1910).
Aug.
1888,
page
11,
available
at
167. Legal
Fictions,
SPECTATOR,
http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/25th-august-1888/11/legal-fictions.
168. See Clifford Ando, Fact, Fiction, and Social Reality in Roman Law, in LEGAL
FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 295–323 (2015); Knauer, supra note 157, at 2 (used by a
praetor “in order to extend a right of action beyond its intended scope.”).
169. See MAINE, supra note 159, at 24–25.
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common example included asserting that one is a Roman citizen to gain an
advantage in court, when one was really a foreigner.170
Another less prosaic example involved a practice at the cult of Jupiter
where procedural shortcuts existed allowing items ordinarily made sacred
(therefore property of the gods) to undergo “desacralization” by the mere
language of written fictions.171 This type of fiction created by authoritarian
pronouncements can be seen in the writings of Livy when he describes the
aftermath of a failed battle of Lake Trasimene during the Second Punic
War.172 In an effort to appease the gods, Rome instated a sacrifice involving
“an offering of all the young of animals to be born in spring.”173 The
language, indicative of the type of fictions decreed by will, read: “Do you
will and so order that these things be done in the manner following? . . . Let
him who shall make a sacrifice do so at such time and by such rite as shall
seem good to him; in what manner soever he does it, let it be accounted
duly done.”174
While many of the fictions in Roman law possessed a quality of
authoritative pronouncements contradicting known realities, others
according to Sir Henry Main were used for the purpose of granting
170. See Simon Stern, Legal Fictions and Exclusionary Rules, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 158 (2015).
171. Ando, supra note 168, at 307. Items received as “gi[ft], donation or dedication” were
able to circumvent the requirement by the mere language in the clause (“let it be profane”)
after it was used or sold as if it underwent the requisite desacralization. Id. This power to
create new legal facts through an authorities’ utterance in classical antiquity was evidenced
by a number of recitations in Arthur Darby Nock’s chapter on Roman religion. Id. at 307–08;
Arthur Darby Nock, A Feature of Roman Religion, in ROMAN RELIGION 84–96 (Ando ed.,
2003).
172. Patrick Hunt, Battle of Trasimene, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Battle-of-Trasimene.
173. Nock, supra note 171, at 84.
174. TITUS LIVIUS (Livy), HISTORY OF ROME 22.10.1-3 (Foster, ed. 1919), available at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0152%3Abook%3
D22%3Achapter%3D10 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Livy]. Livy goes on:
If the animal which he ought to sacrifice dies, let it be deemed unconsecrated
and let no guilt attach to him; if any shall hurt it or slay it unawares, let it be no
sin; if any shall steal it, let no guilt attach to the People nor to him from whom
it shall have been stolen; if he shall sacrifice unwittingly on a black day, let the
sacrifice be deemed to have been duly made; by night or by day, if slave or
freeman perform the sacrifice, let it be deemed to have been duly made; if
sacrifice shall be performed before the senate and the People shall have ordered
it to be performed, let the People be absolved therefrom and free of obligation.
22 LIVY, HISTORY OF ROME 10.5-7 (Foster, ed. 1919), available at
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0152%3Abook
%3D22%3Achapter%3D10#note4.
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jurisdiction.175 These latter uses provides a natural shift into the common
law where, for example, Courts like the Queen’s Bench and Exchequer
“contrived to usurp the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas” by asserting that
the “defendant was in custody of the king’s marshal, or that the plaintiff was
the king’s debtor.”176
2. Common Law
At common law, the use of legal fictions became much more prevalent—
some would even say a more “brutal”177 practice—allowing for existing
developments to give way to novel purposes.178 An important process called
“exploratory fictions” became an instrument that allowed for common law
judges to grope around the law for useful principles—a practice often
recognized as the very “spirit of the common law.”179 Through this process,
various procedural advantages were developed,180 opportunities for cases to
be heard by jury were created,181 as well as establishing increasingly

175. MAINE, supra note 159, at 25. Maine explains the jurisdiction use:
Fictio, in old Roman law, is properly a term of pleading, and signifies a false
averment on the part of the plaintiff which the defendant was not allowed to
traverse; such, for example, as an averment that the plaintiff was a Roman
citizen when in truth he was a foreigner.
Id. at 24–25.
176. Id.; Miller, supra note 166, at 628–29.
177. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 31–32 (1921).
178. Michael Lobban, Legal Fictions before the Age of Reform, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 199–201 (2015).
179. Maksymilian Del Mar, Legal Fictions and Legal Change in the Common Law
Tradition, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 235 (2015). William Blackstone, for
example, noted the use of fictions can be highly beneficial as an end. See 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 43 (Lewis ed., 1897) (“[I]ts proper
operation being to prevent a mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might result from
the general rule of law”); Knauer, supra note 157, at 14 (quoting Blackstone in applauding
the use of fictions as an end, but not the means). Roscoe Pound described how fictions
served a process of molding the law without legislative action and meeting the immediate
needs of parties as they arise. Roscoe Pound, Sources, Forms, Modes of Growth, in 3
JURISPRUDENCE 465 (West Publishing Co. 1959).
180. One example was the creation of an action called indebitatus assumpsit, which
allowed for the Plaintiff to assert, without a showing of evidence, that a promise had been
made to repay (“being so indebted, he undertook”) a debt by virtue of the debt’s existence.
Lobban, supra note 178, at 202; J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
343, 347–48 (2002); DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 157 (2004).
181. One example was fictitiously using the action of assumpsit to “raise questions on a
feigned issue or wager” that would then be submitted to a jury for determination. Lobban,
supra note 178, at 203 (stating that the “device was used by courts (notably the Chancery) to
allow disputed matters to be tried by jury at the assizes.”).
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convenient ways to transfer property—often times done with the purpose of
avoiding tax liability.182
Among the most famous fictions included creating false or highly
exaggerated scenarios in order to satisfy conditions in the writ called
trespass vi et armis, which required that the wrong be committed “with
force and arms” (vi et armis).183 One example—the case of Rattlesdene v
Grunestone (1317)—included a sale of wine where the buyer asserted that
the seller had opened the wine—using the appropriate pleading language
(“with force and arms drew”)—prior to delivery and replaced a substantial
part of its content with salt water.184 In reality, this was probably a

182. See BAKER, supra note 180, at 242–43 (stating that the “incidents which most needed
avoidance . . . arose when a tenant died and the fee descended to his heir. . . . [therefore t]he
essence of most feudal tax-dodges was . . . to ensure that land did not descend to an heir.”);
COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 108–10 (lists taxes that were imposed on landowners and
attempts to reduce costs through tax evasion); Lobban, supra note 178, at 203–04 (discusses
the evolution of the use of the statute De Donis to transfer real property). Famous reforms
took place by King Edward I (reigned from 1272-1307) that shut down some of these
loopholes discovered by lawyers that deprived lords of certain fees when property was, e.g.
transferred to ecclesiastical bodies (“mortmain”) or through subinfeudation (process of
dividing or returning land to new or prior tenants having the effect of greatly reducing dues).
See THEODORE F.T. PUCKETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 30–31 (1956);
COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 107–10; BAKER, supra note 180, at 242.
183. TWO BODIES supra note 159, at 41; COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 156. Injured
parties at the start had to fit their claims into existing writs that had to be bought from the
Chancery (King’s secretariat) and had to encapsulate the action being brought—otherwise
the other party would not be forced to respond. COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 149–51;
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 89 (2009) (“fixed forms for fixed
purposes”); see also TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 53 (“plaintiff whose case did not fit an
existing writ might use the nearest writ and hope no one would object”); Peter Handfod,
Intentional Negligence: A Contradiction in Terms, 32 SYDNEY L. REV. 29, 34 (2010) (“[T]he
need to plead the standard writ formulae in order to persuade the common law courts to
take jurisdiction caused pleaders, and perhaps the courts, to indulge in legal fictions. . . .”).
Eventually, a number of innovations allowed for a more progressive approach to using writs.
King Edward I’s Statute of Westminster II (1285) allowed for clerks to draft new (ad hoc)
writs for the purpose of justice. See COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 151 (“[L]et a writ be
made by those learned in the law so that for the future it shall not befall that the court fail in
doing justice . . . .”). However, its usefulness, in the context of trespass writs, was
questionable. See BAKER, supra note 180, at 62 (“It was nearly seventy years after 1285 before
the abandonment of the vi et armis requirement in practice, and the fictions resorted to in
the interim would have been unnecessary and absurd if the statute had already authorized
the change.”). In the 1350s, perhaps occasioned by challenges created by the Black Plague, a
new writ (trespass on the case) removed the vie et armis language. See BAKER, supra note 180,
at 61–64.
184. BAKER, supra note 180, at 341 (2002); DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 44 (2001). Innovations like these allowed for something like the
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fraudulent transaction or, as David Ibbetson suggests, a shipping
accident.185 Because no one had to swear an affidavit to the underlying facts,
clerks were able to issue the necessary writ despite the evidence of “force”
being thin or non-existent.186 Reflecting on the writings of Sir Henry Maine,
Michael Lobban writes: “fictions allowed the law to develop, while
disguising the fact that it was changing. They maintained a sense of stability
in law, at the same time that the law moulded [sic] itself to the needs of its
community.”187 This idea was explained well by Maksymillian Del Mar who
wrote that “[l]egal fictions . . . are created in the coal-face of legal change,
which serves two masters: the conservative pressure of the system and the
call of the injured pleading for a remedy.”188 If anything was clear, it is that
jurists wanted the evolution of the law to bear the imprimatur of yesterday’s
foundation.
3. Bentham’s Warning
Perhaps no one189 was a bigger enemy of legal fictions than Jeremy
Bentham (1748-1832), who compared fictions-to-justice with swindling-totrade;190 compared their usefulness-to-justice with poison-to-sustenance;191
and, called them the “basest sort of lying.”192 In other places, he wrote that
“the pestilential breath of Fiction poisons the sense of every instrument it

action of trespass vi et armis to give rise to general actions for torts, contracts, and recovering
property. See Lobban, supra note 178, at 200.
185. See IBBETSON, supra note 184, at 44. “Similar writs alleging the forcible extraction
and adulteration of wine, all looking suspiciously like shipping accidents, are found
throughout the fourteenth century.” Id. at 44–45.
186. BAKER, supra note 159, at 41.
187. Lobban, supra note 178, at 200.
188. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 228.
189. According to Del Mar, “the bulk of literature [on fictions] is negative in tone,”
noting that fictions are not necessary in mature legal systems. Del Mar, supra note 179, at
239.
190. 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 283 (Bowring’s edition, 1843);
but see Michael Quinn, Fuller on Legal Fictions: A Benthamic Perspective, in LEGAL FICTIONS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 56–57 (2015) (arguing that Bentham while critical of fictions did
not reject them per se). As Michael Quinn outlines, Bentham was most bitter with a type of
“theoretical fiction” which he simply called fallacies—e.g. natural law, social contract—which
he considered to be dangerous when “swallowed whole by the mass of the people, since
lawyers and politicians use them as if they were true.” Quinn, supra, at 65, 67 (emphasis
added). If none of that is convincing, then there is always Bentham himself who admitted
that “there was once a time, perhaps, when [fictions] had their use.” 1 BENTHAM, supra, at
268.
191. 6 BENTHAM, supra note 190, at 582.
192. Id.
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comes near”193 and “in English law, fiction is a syphilis, which runs in every
vein, and carries into every part of the system the principle of rottenness.”194
While Bentham’s protestations are certainly characteristic of his ornate
writing, his warnings of the danger of legal fictions are well noted.195
Looking to Bentham, Michael Quinn offers this stark analysis: “[t]he
powerful know that to determine the terms of discussion is to rule. The
point of legal fictions . . . is to divert attention and sow confusion, and
thereby to stifle investigation.”196 While in fictions it may be that the
audience is being deceived through the act of counterfactual-assertions—
perhaps driven toward a utilitarian purpose that ostensibly serves the public
good—a danger remains when judges, driven by the whims of partisan
alignment and expediency, fail to acknowledge that the tool of deceiving
others may often become a tool of self-deception.197 A failure to examine
these fictions and the underlying evidence that contradict leads to error in
the development of the law and the harm that comes when deception is
weaponized by one groups to rule over another.198
These warnings should bring us pause when considering the utility of the
non-distinction approach in its current sweep. While other uses for fictions

193. Id. at vol. 1, p. 235.
194. Id. at vol. 5, p. 92.
195. Maine had this to say about Bentham’s revulsion of fictions: “We must . . . not suffer
ourselves to be affected by the ridicule which Bentham pours on legal fictions wherever he
meets them. To revile them as merely fraudulent is to betray ignorance of their peculiar
office in the historical development of law.” MAINE, supra note 159, at 26.
196. Quinn, supra note 190, at 67.
197. Id. at 68.
198. Id. “Fictions which become embedded in our mental furniture prevent salient
questions from occurring to us, so that we think under the direction of an unconscious selfdenying ordinance.” Id.; see also Smith, supra note 159, at 153 (fictions “tend to prevent
investigation as to the fundamental principle underlying a rule of law and to retard the
framing of a statement of the rule in strictly accurate terms.”). Remarking on the acceptance
of historical fictions uncritically, Pierre Olivier writes:
It stands to reason that if a rule is accepted in vague and half-formulated form,
the uncertainty surrounding it will sooner or later give rise to problems of
application and eventually to costly litigation. Similarly, if the principle
underlying a legal rule is neglected and represented by a fiction, the future
development of the rule will remain in a morass of uncertainty. True
development of the law is only possible by developing and extending its
fundamental principles. In the absence of a clear insight into the principles
underlying a legal rule, its application and extension cannot proceed in a
rational and intelligent manner.
PIERRE J.J. OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL SCIENCE 136 (Aubert eds. 1975).
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exist,199 there are three particular sub-species that embrace the type of
reasoning offered by the courts in Section III.
B. Non-Distinction as Legal Fiction
As noted above, the general approach to legal fictions is to understand
them as useful statements or assumptions made in contradiction to known
facts. A further definition that underlies the approaches below is the idea
that fictions are useful because they allow the alteration of the law while still
199. While legal fictions have been shown to provide a number of useful procedural
mechanisms throughout history (discussed above), they have also been used couch abstract
ideas in an effort to help us better understand the world. Christoph Kletzer, Kelsen on
Vaihinger, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 24 (2015). For example, a fiction can
be used to assume that a thing existed that in fact had not (“metaphysical fictions”) or to
explain, justify, or make sense of the law (“explanatory fictions”). Lobban, supra note 178, at
204. A more interesting use involves assuming a historical lineage of a practice that had
simply become fixed (“historical fictions”). Id.; see also FULLER, supra note 154, at 56
(“[S]ome few may perhaps be intended as apologies for rules of law that have existed from
the beginning of our legal system.”). Bentham remarks that the historical fiction was a
“willful falsehood, having for its object the stealing [of] legislative power.” 1 BENTHAM, supra
note 190, at 243. Among its other uses—as pointed out by Hans Kelsen—is that legal fictions
provide an expedient way to subsume a case under an existing norm, which would otherwise
not capture it—that is “to treat the case as if it fell under the legal norm.” Hans Kelsen, On
the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With Special Consideration of Vaihinger’s Philosophy of the AsIf, in LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 14 (Christoph Kletzer trans. 2015). In this
vein, Hans Vaihinger describes their use as a process towards “cognition of the actual world”
by means of a “fabrication, a contradiction, a sleight of hand, a detour and passage of
thought.” Id. at 4, 7 (“[I]t lies within the nature of fictions to entangle us in contradictions.”).
A helpful analogy offered by Kelsen to understand fictions, especially why they can be
characterized as detours, is a rock climber who purposely has to climb down in order to
avoid some obstacle standing in the way of his final destination. Id. at 5. While the final
destination is the “object of cognition,” the understanding of some particular legal order, the
climb down as analogy for legal fiction connotes the idea of having to consciously assume
something in contradiction to this final object in order to finally reach it. Id. Vaihinger
writes:
By its very own doing thought leads us onto certain pseudo-concepts just as
seeing leads us into unavoidable optical illusions. As soon as we recognise this
optical semblance as being necessary, as soon as we consciously accept the
fictions created by it . . . and also see through them we can bear the ensuring
logical contradictions as necessary products of our thought and reach the
insight that they are the necessary consequences of the inner mechanism of the
thinking organ itself.
Id. at 7. Said more succinctly, the idea behind legal fictions is to “seemingly fashion legal
truths out of factual falsehoods.” Lind, supra note 154, at 84. This latter usage will be
discussed in much greater detail next to show how the non-distinction approach is a legal
fiction.
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retaining traces of a former system.200 While it is difficult to judge what is
the underlying motive for using the non-distinction approach to form new
legal rules,201 below are three approaches that explain the type of legal
fiction that has been embraced.
1. Lon Fuller: False Statements of Utility
The first is the classical definition provided by Lon Fuller when he
describes a fiction to be “either (1) a statement propounded with a complete
or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as
having utility.”202
Following the reasoning from Vaihinger, Fuller considered that the
quality of fictions is not by virtue of their truth or conformity with reality—
an incoherent standard since by definition fictions contradict reality—but
in there utility for “simplifying and organizing data, and in converting new
experiences into familiar terms.”203 This utility,204 central to Fuller’s own
understanding of fictions, is connected with a conscious205 effort to improve
the law.206 Fuller writes that while fictions are not meant to deceive,207 they
do provide the means for changing the rule of law by judges taking on a
legislative function in “acting under the influence of some half-articulate
philosophy of law” that seems to them to be justified in light of prior
formulas.208 While cognizant of the inadequacies of using fictions, judges do
so nonetheless for lack of alternatives for expressing the same idea or
200. See Smith, supra note 159, at 149–50. The “purpose (and virtue) of the legal fiction
was to ease the impact (and lessen the appearance) of legal change . . . .” Smith, supra note
111, at 1470. Further, where the classical use was a device used for “softening,” new legal
fictions are “instrumental in justifying doctrine, whether received or newly established.” Id.
201. Peter J. Smith notes that “new legal fictions [like their classical use] are sometimes a
device that judges deploy to mask the fact that they are arrogating to themselves the power to
make normative choices, and thus to make law itself.” Smith, supra note 111, at 1469.
202. FULLER, supra note 154, at 9 (emphasis added); Smith, supra note 111, at 1466
(“Fuller provided the most comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon . . . .”).
203. Quinn, supra note 190, at 56 (citation omitted).
204. Fuller admits that Vaihinger’s philosophy bears a close similarity with American
pragmatism. FULLER, supra note 154, at 96.
205. Fuller is keen on the idea that “[a] fiction becomes wholly safe only when it is used
with a complete consciousness of its falsity.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). A fiction may be “an
expedient, but consciously false, assumption.” Id. at 7, 9 (citation omitted).
206. Lind, supra note 154, at 85; see also FULLER, supra note 154, at 9–10 (“A fiction taken
seriously . . . becomes dangerous and loses its utility.”).
207. While certainly possible for fictions to be implicated by a process of deceit, Fuller
writes that its original use was not intended to serve this function. FULLER, supra note 154, at
7, 57 (“[I]t is . . . difficult to see how the supposed deceit could actually succeed.”).
208. Id. He goes on, “[fictions] may, perhaps, be held accountable as accomplice in a
process of deception, but not as principal.” Id.
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developing a similar doctrine.209 Interpreting the implicit suggestions of
Vaihinger, Fuller writes that our minds undergo a process of reducing
reality into something we are more familiar with or converting new
experiences into familiar terms.210
Maybe more interestingly is not how the process works, but why it
works. The question posed by Vaihinger is instructive for our general
discussion on the non-distinction approach: “How does it come about that
with consciously false ideas we are yet able to reach conclusions that are
right?”211 Fuller, in discussing motives for fictions,212 argues that fictions are
often implemented as devices to escape existing laws or “vague principle of
jurisprudence or morals.”213 If the right under the First Amendment stands
to apply to sellers of goods in the public arena, then judges must necessarily
remove the protection of the First Amendment in order to realign the
present cases with fact patterns formerly rejected (i.e., racial invidious
discrimination).
Among the useful analogies offered by Fuller is the one comparing legal
fictions to scaffolds supporting “new developments in thought,” noting that
once the building is complete, the scaffolds are removed so long as the
falsity of the claim is readily acknowledged.214 This allows the “defects” of
209. Id. at 8, 10. “A judge may find himself forced to employ a fiction because of his
inability to state his result in nonfictitious terms.” Id. at 64. Furthermore, “the fiction is often
but a cruder outcropping of a process of intellectual adaptation which goes on constantly
without attracting attention.” Id. at 66 (emphasis added). This statement corresponds closely
with the pragmatic realignment approach—especially, within the premise of adapting new
rules into old categories with minimal disturbance. Infra. Section IV.A.iii.
210. FULLER, supra note 154, at 106.
211. Id. at 103.
212. Fuller notes that although discovering the motives for fictions is important, the
process is certainly difficult and leads us into a “conjectural field.” Id. at 8. He writes that
“[o]ne can scarcely conceive of a more complex and speculative problem than that of human
motives.” Id. at 49; see also Kenneth Campbell, Fuller on Legal Fictions, 2 LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY 339, 346–47 (1983) (“Reference to motivations . . . tends to be rather more
ambiguous between conscious reasons and the unconscious desires and beliefs that lead to
performance of that action.”).
213. FULLER, supra note 154, at 53. The example Fuller provides for escaping “existing
rules” is the introduction of the attractive nuisance doctrine that would otherwise not apply
given the existing laws that says “no duty [of care to] . . . trespassers.” Id. at 53, 66–68.
214. Quinn, supra note 190, at 67. This metaphor was coined by John Chipman Gray.
Knauer, supra note 157, at 11. Bentham thinks that removing this scaffold should be
immediate once his own model is available, noting it to be “a disgrace to the architect that
rubbish and scaffolding should continue in any part to deform the building.” Quinn, supra
note 190, at 67. I tend to agree that the fiction of non-distinction, although meriting some
utility in unique factual circumstances that lead to the correct legal conclusion, should be
immediately removed when another approach based on a more sophisticated examination of
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existing laws on speech and religion—as rightly applied to protecting a right
of refusal for expressive acts—to give way to a traditional interest of ridding
invidious discrimination by the process of applying the non-distinction
approach. As Fuller writes, “[T]he fiction is the cement that is always at
hand to plaster together the weak spots in our intellectual structure.”215 This
approach allows the judge a sense of emotional conservatism, a selfdeception that the existing rules do in fact determine the case and that noreal innovation has taken place.216
This idea is further elaborated when we look to the pragmatic approach
(below). For now, it is worth noting how well this connects to Fuller’s
discussion of linguistics217 and the use of terms like “discrimination” to
apply to the cases in Section III. The non-distinction approach has the
benefit of, not only aligning the scaffold with an old and rejected tradition
that allowed for race-based discrimination, but also allowing for the same
consequences to apply to a novel act (i.e., refusing an artistic request based
on fears of endorsing sinful behavior) in a way that produces the same
normative consequences.218 This is further elaborated in our second
approach.

the facts can be applied. As Jeremiah Smith writes, while the scaffolding serves a function
while the building is in construction, after it is complete, it serves only to obscure it. Smith,
supra note 159, at 155.
215. FULLER, supra note 154, at 52.
216. Id. at 58; see also Smith, supra note 159, at 150 (The fiction is “frequently resorted to
in the attempt to conceal the fact that the law is undergoing alteration at the hands of the
judges.”).
217. “The fiction is further a phenomenon of language in the sense that the question
whether a given statement is a fiction is always, when examined critically, a question of the
proprieties of language.” FULLER, supra note 154, at 11. To the question of whether all
fictions should be rejected, Fuller writes that this approach is inadvisable given how much
fictions have become “the growing pains of the language of the law.” Id. at 22. His answer is
one of moderation: some fictions should be rejected, others retained. Id.
218. Borrowing from Fuller’s discussion on legal relations that are “accurately described
and actually enforced” (e.g., the way the law talks about a husband and a wife) as distinct
from fictions—in the context of a legal relationship between the act of refusing a certain
request from same-sex couples and the requisite intent for invidious discrimination, the
non-distinction approach is “inadequate and misleading.” See id. at 33. While courts
seemingly imply that the legal relation between a seller and a buyer in the above-mentioned
cases is one of discriminatory intent in violation of the state’s antidiscrimination laws, this is
simply an inaccurate description which leads to a false application of law (or at least what the
law intended to protect).

704

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:663

2. Maksymilian Del Mar: Suspension of Operative Facts
Maksymilian Del Mar talks about a second way of using fictions that
relates back to the non-distinction approach.219 This approach involves
suspending one or more of the operative facts required for an “associated
normative consequence” when proof is absent or proof of the opposite is
available.220 An abstract example of this is offered by Peter Birks that goes
like this. A normative consequence “X” can be achieved so long as four
(hypothetical) elements are met: A, B, C, and D.221 However, judicial
determination over time may allow the same results (i.e., X) if the claimants
can show any two of the elements—say A and D or A, D, and Z.222 So,
despite future claimants still being able to reach the same normative
consequence by showing all four elements (i.e., A, B, C, and D), a new
method has been developed over time that allows for a showing of only two
elements to reach the same normative consequences as if all four elements
had been met.223
This approach is akin to the idea mentioned in the context of the
common law where fictions allowed the law to grope its way towards a
principle.224 Unlike Fuller’s approach, this one does not require a
“consciousness of falsity” and really relates to those instances where issues
exist with finding available proof.225 Unlike Bentham, Del Mar sees the
benefits of fictions and believes that if used wisely, over time, they can
provide to courts a dynamic resource to “balance flexibility and
responsiveness with stability and predictability.”226 Like Fuller’s scaffold that
supports the development of thought over time (as evidence in common
law), Del Mar offers an analogy to building blocks that possess the quality of
being shaped or removed in an effort to create a more stable structure.227
Unlike the views of Maine or Pound that dismissed the need for fictions in a
219. Del Mar, supra note 179.
220. Id. at 226, 229–30.
221. Id. at 235.
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing Peter Birks, Fictions ancient and modern, in THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS FOR
TONY HONORÉ 86 (MacCormick and Birks eds., 1986). Baker writes,
The essence of the classic English fiction is that proof of a certain fact asserted
in a lawsuit was completely dispensed with by the simple expedient of denying
any means of disputing it. The false allegation in such cases was of some fact
which had once been required [is] . . . no longer regarded as material.
TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 41.
224. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 235.
225. Id. at 226.
226. Id. at 227.
227. Id.
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developed system,228 Del Mar considers their benefits as tools for
suspending certain operative facts “already [attached to] existing rule’s
normative consequences.”229
As this relates to the non-distinction approach, claimants today bringing
a claim of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (identity) are
able to couch their language in the historical prohibition on invidious
discrimination per se (e.g., racism) without having to prove that the actions
themselves have anything to do with the customer’s identity.230 While a sign
on the door of a business saying “No Blacks Allowed” was evidence of per se
discrimination since the owner would not even entertain the order; today,
the refusal of any request that is “inextricable connected” with the
customers identity becomes a per se violation on the basis of identity. All
this despite the pleadings before the court. Notably, in the outlier cases such
as Hands On Original, the court refused to adopt the non-distinction
approach because the judge refused to assign the wrongful act of invidious
discrimination to a simple act of refusal without further evidence (i.e., A, B,
C, and D).
Notwithstanding the benefits of using fictions, the danger of
prematurely231 suspending operative facts is expressed well by John Baker
when he—mindful of the changing character of legal fictions—wrote that
the use of fictions might at first “slip into practice without challenge, and if
repeated often enough could become so rooted that a future challenge
would be unlikely to succeed.”232 With further repetition, the practice will
be introduced into more contentious issues, “provided that they were seen to
228. Maine considered fictions to be among the three ways that the law could be
changed—the other two being equity and legislation. MAINE, supra note 159, at 24. Roscoe
Pound similarly found that fictions were useful in developing the law in legal history, but like
Maine, believed fictions were “clumsy device[s] . . . not suited to later times and developed
systems,” in fact acting to “retard growth and clog development.” Pound, supra note 179, at
465–66.
229. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 241.
230. As Baker notes, “The object of fictions is that they allow the operation of the law to
change while avoiding any outward alteration in the rules.” TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at
35. This idea is further connected with the minimal disturbance approach taken by Douglas
Lind discussed in Section IV.B.iii and what Daniel R. Coquillette noted in his excellent book
on Anglo-American Legal Heritage, he writes: “Fictions permit useful incremental reform,
when wide scale reform is too threatening.” COQUILLETTE, supra note 180, at 283.
231. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 237 (“[W]e need to see that it is only after a period of
time that it becomes (or might become) clear that a certain operative act can be
dispensed . . . .”).
232. Id. (quoting TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 54). This is reminiscent of what Roscoe
Pound called the “dogmatic fictions” that are worked out as a means for providing a rational
explanation for existing precepts. Pound, supra note 179, at 455, 460.
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have a just objective.”233 Importantly, Del Mar sees that his approach as a
study of “common law epistemology” (i.e., the process of how we come to
know or understand the law) is something resolutely pragmatic.234 This idea
of pragmatism is where we turn to next.
3. Douglas Lind: Pragmatism of Re-Alignment
The third and final approach discussed here under the rubric of legal
fictions in relation to the non-distinction approach is the idea of using
fictions as a pragmatic tool to bring current facts in re-alignment with
traditional norms—to make use of fictions in solving new problems.235 This
idea—alongside those mentioned above—was also introduced by Fuller
when he described the motive of convenience, which involves the changing
or adapting of the law through devises that appear to uphold a traditional
way of thinking.236 The idea connecting fictions with utility was also hinted
on by Del Mar in the above section and will now be discussed in more detail
looking to the writings of William James237 and Douglas Lind.238
Specific to our discussion surrounding the common law, David Ibbetson
has a helpful starting point in understanding the idea of “pragmatic
incrementalism [as] the spirit of change in the common law.”239 He writes,
Legal change occurs through filling in gaps between rules in the
way that seems most convenient or most just at the time; through
twisting existing rules, or rediscovering old ones, to give the
impression that a change in the law is no more than the
application of the law that was already in place; through
reformulating claims into a different conceptual category,
normally one less encumbered by restrictive rules; through
inventing new rules that get tacked onto the existing ones; . . .
through injecting shifting ideas of fairness and justice; and, very

233. TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 54 (emphasis added).
234. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 238.
235. See FULLER, supra note 154, at 94 (“[F]iction is generally the product of the law’s
struggles with new problems”).
236. See id. at 59–70 (allowing for “assimilating that which is unfamiliar to that which is
already known”). Quoting Savigny: “When a new juridical form arises it is joined directly on
to an old and existing institution and in this way the certainty and development of the old is
procured for the new.” Id. at 59 (citation omitted). While the judge may use nonfictitious
language, he uses a fiction with an intent to bring a preferred legal “reform within the
linguistic cover of existing law” in order to “avoid discommoding current notions.” Id. at 62.
237. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM (2003).
238. Lind, supra note 154.
239. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 244.
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occasionally, through adopting wholesale procrustean theoretical
frameworks into which the exiting law can be squeezed.240
Lind takes to the optimism of Del Mar in seeing that the use of fictions
can be a useful tool for advancing the law.241 He proposes that they be
understood as “true legal propositions asserted with conscious recognition
that they are inconsistent . . . with true propositions asserted within some
other linguistic system (or elsewhere within law).”242 If used correctly, legal
fictions243 will inflict no damage and allow for the development of a better
system of rules.244 If used incorrectly, legal fictions can have the effect of
“upsett[ing] settled meanings or truths, work injustice, or mask underlying
processes of legal reasoning.”245
Taking to the writings of William James, Lind discusses the idea of
truth—being suspended from absoluteness—can be used as a practical
means toward some problem or purpose.246 That truth is an instrument for
carving out those things suitable to our preference—guided by our
conception of reality—in an every changing world of experience.247 Looking
to a stock of new information, William James argues that “we are all
extreme conservatives” for we all seek to realign our new gained

240. DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATION 294
(1999).
241. Lind, supra note 154, at 84. Lind writes that legal fictions treated as conscious false
assumptions is regrettable since this creates “logical confusion, renders fictions unnecessarily
confounding, and compromises the integrity of law and judicial decision-making.” Id.
Sidney T. Miler likewise shares in their optimism, writing: “legal fictions, which required the
play of some fancy in their beginning, have fallen not only into disuse but also into disfavor.
Many of them, however, have done good work in the past, and some are doing it now.”
Miller, supra note 166, at 623.
242. Lind, supra note 154, at 84. This is reminiscent of Baker’s discussion of the rule of
law as distinct from fictions since developing legal systems imply the use of certain concepts
for certain legal purposes that no one believes are actually true. See TWO BODIES, supra note
159, at 44–45.
243. Lind calls them a “form of creative lawmaking, a phenomenon of legal (primarily
judicial) technique employed to resolve trouble in the legal environment.” Lind, supra note
154, at 84.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 88–90; see also JAMES, supra note 237, at 97 (“The true . . . is only the expedient
in the way of our thinking.”). Lind writes that “the truth of a proposition depends on its
‘consequences to someone engaged on a real problem for some purpose.’” Lind, supra note
154, at 90 (quoting F.C.S. SCHILLER, HUMANISM: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 59 (1903)).
247. Id. at 90–91.
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information with old trains of thought.248 Our commitment to the old ways
often meets the demands for radical modification when we meet new facts
tending to contradict our traditional notions.249 If the old cannot survive
and a blanket change of opinion is not an option, we seek to graft the new
facts within our existing systems with minimum disturbance—the new
experiences allowed to refine our previous belief.250 We try to fit new wine
into old wineskins—“gear[ing] the new idea into a workable notion that
reconciles satisfactorily the new truth and the old stock.”251
From there, Lind applies this same thinking to legal fictions as a tool
within a specific system used in an effort to assimilate new information to a
traditional approach.252 His ultimate goal in applying this method is to get
away from the thinking that legal fictions are legal falsehoods and to see
their propositions—in light of the specific legal system—as, in fact, true.253
Under this model, statements like “a corporation is a person” must be
248. JAMES, supra note 237, at 26; see also FULLER, supra note 154, at 82 (defining
“intellectual conservatism” as “the fiction that makes a new legal conclusion ‘thinkable’ by
converting it into familiar terms”). As noted above, Fuller also argues that implicit in the
discussion of Vaihinger is the process of converting new experiences into familiar terms. See
also FULLER, supra note 154, at 106 n.21. “Vaihinger’s fundamental theses it that our minds
do not merely reflect reality, but alter it and ‘work it over’ to suit our needs.” Id. at 115; see
also Lind, supra note 154, at 91 (“Loyalty to the older truths is the first principle in this
process; most often it wins out.”).
249. JAMES, supra note 237, at 26.
250. Id.; Lind, supra note 154, at 92. “The truths we fashion from experience and
reflection accordingly are ‘effective in just the degree in which [they have] been worked into
a system—a comprehensive and orderly arrangement.’” Id. (quoting JOHN DEWEY, ESSAYS IN
EXPERIMENT LOGIC 54 (1916)).
251. Lind, supra note 154, at 91. “[The new idea] preserves the older stock of truths with
a minimum of modification, stretching them just enough to make them admit the novelty,
but conceiving that in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible . . . New truth is always a
go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact as ever to
show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity.” JAMES, supra note 237, at 27. As Baker
notes, fictions may correspond to our experiences that “it is more convenient, more fitting,
and perhaps more comforting, to preserve the traditional forms over the centuries while
modifying—sometimes drastically changing—their operation.” TWO BODIES, supra note 159,
at 48. Speaking on the human tendency to convert sad events into happy ones, Tourtoulon
writes that the “lawmaker sometimes tries . . . to efface unfortunate realities as far as possible
and to evoke the shades of fortunate realities which have not been achieved.” TOURTOULON,
supra note 165, at 386 (emphasis added).
252. Lind, supra note 154, at 91.
253. Id. at 93. “By the pragmatist understanding, an utterance in the form of a legal
fiction, such as ‘A corporation is a person’, must be investigated for meaning and evaluated
for truth strictly within law.” Id. In this sense, the non-distinction approach is still a legal
fiction, but now a true proposition if seen strictly within the law (subject to the interpretation
of reliance verses discussed in Section V.A.).
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investigated for meaning and/or evaluated for truth strictly within law.254 In
this sense, the non-distinction approach is still a legal fiction, but now a true
proposition if seen strictly within the law—subject now to attack based on,
inter alia, reliance verses and proper distinctions (discussed in Section V)
that make up the legal construction of this proverbial scaffold.
Considering the re-alignment approach in the context of the abovementioned cases. Courts are taking new facts, stripping the claimant’s
contextual reliance on the First Amendment where the Constitution would
otherwise protect them, and re-aligning the present debate on sexual
orientation in the framework of race-based antidiscrimination laws. This is
arguably done not based on the merit of the non-distinction approach, but
as Lind described, to create minimum disturbance and maximum
continuity. Seeing the vitriolic outcry, the emotional toll on same-sex
claimants, and the negative popular press surrounding these businesses that
refuse to serve gay couples, this shift is understandable. Tourtoulon
summarizes these sentiments well when he writes that while “the fiction is a
subtle instrument of juridical technic, it is also clearly the expression of a
desire inherent in human nature, the desire to efface unpleasant realities
and evoke imaginary good fortune.”255 The past struggles of the gay
community are real and the desire to retain their present momentum is
important. But at what cost?
a. A problem of overflow
Even if we grant the re-alignment approach as a just theory, and that the
falsity of legal propositions in everyday life does not affect the
“proposition’s truth value within law,”256 decisions made by the court
cannot be hermetically sealed off from popular opinion. The press is
treating those opinions as if they were true, thus introducing a second-level
conflation (first being the non-distinction approach) between truth within
the law—and, now, truths in the public square (despite meaning and truth
being found strictly within the law).257 Lind himself points out that legal

254. Id.
255. TOURTOULON, supra note 165, at 386.
256. Lind, supra note 154, at 93.
257. Fuller writes that economist’s use of the term “economic animal” has utility if used
to develop laws of economics, but if used to develop foundations in ethics would be
disastrous. FULLER, supra note 154, at 107. Fuller writes: “For certain purposes it is useful to
exclude the field of morality from that of law. But again, the separation must be regarded as
provisional only. It must not be taken for a permanent reality.” Id.
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fictions have value to the extent they “work no havoc on any general stock
of beliefs outside law.”258
While there is some benefit in using legal fictions that yield only
“harmless inconsistency while working some functional utility or
effectiveness within law,”259 the non-distinction approach has caused great
economic and emotional harm to individuals like Melissa Klein, Barronelle
Stutzman, and Jack Phillips, thanks to the rhetoric of re-aligning their
identities with Jim Crow racists. This is why it is important to stress the
“gulf between reality and fiction”—keeping a close eye on the two and the
consequences of conflating one into the other.260 The court’s use of legal
fictions as a pragmatic tool by the process of employing the non-distinction
approach is among those nefarious uses mentioned by Lind that tends to be
a tool for distorting the settled application of the First Amendment, while
seemingly masking the underlying processes of legal reasoning behind a veil
of political expediency as an effort to protect the dignity of the LGBT
community. We turn next to challenging some of the foundations of the
scaffold developed through the non-distinction approach and suggest a
subtle shift in our legal thinking that allows for religious claimants to assert
first amendment defenses while preserving antidiscrimination laws in their
proper context.
V. BETWEEN SANCTION AND PERSECUTION
Where the common law used the instrument of fictions to develop a
system better fitted to the claimants specific requests, I have argued that the
non-distinction approach today advances the purpose of protecting the
dignity of the LGBT community while insuring the survival of
antidiscrimination laws as a tool for social transformation.261 By realigning
258. Lind, supra note 154, at 94. Jurist Matthew Hale notes that “though fictions be a
shew of something that is not . . . they are but expedients without injuring anybody to bring
men to their rights.” MATTHEW HALE AND WILLIAM FLEETWOOD, HALE AND FLEETWOOD ON
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION 24 (Prichard and Yale eds., 1993); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 43 (Lewis ed., 1897) (“no fiction shall extend to
work an injury”).
259. Id.; see also TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 54 (“[T]here was a maxim that legal
fictions ought not to hurt anyone.”).
260. See HANS VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF AS IF 105–06 (Ogden trans., 1935).
261. For those concerned with the treatment and dignity of the LGBT community
understandably would like to use fictions to ensure that the fortunes of the law fall in favor of
the LGBT claimants. Tourtoulon writes: “While the fiction is a subtle instrument of juridical
technique, it is also clearly the expression of a desire inherent in human nature, the desire to
efface unpleasant realities and evoke imaginary good fortune.” TOURTOULON , supra note
165, at 386.
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the present debate with the post-Civil War era attempts to oppress the
African American community, the law has developed a strong normative
case for a sweeping application of antidiscrimination laws notwithstanding
First Amendment defenses.
However, this is not the only way that the law can approach the joint
interest of protecting dignity and ensuring that antidiscrimination laws are
not upended. There is another, a more adequate approach,262 to ensure a
balance between giving to bigotry no sanction and to persecution no
assistance. This approach looks first to some of the foundational pieces of
the non-distinction approach (i.e., reliance verses and non-distinction) in
an effort to challenge their application in certain cases. Next, it argues for a
three-part framework that converts the conclusory nature of the nondistinction approach into an opportunity for rebuttal.
A. Casting a Wider Framework
The means to resolve this problem begins with an honest assessment of
the major cases relied on by state courts to drive the application for the
non-distinction approach and the realization that a distinction does in fact
exist. To use an expression from J.H. Baker, we need the “veil to be lifted, or
dropped”263 in an effort to advance the proper use of legal language so that
the proper normative consequences apply.
1. Reliance Verses
While tracing the origin of the non-distinction approach can only yield a
tentative conclusion,264 the cases listed above continue to return to
essentially the same proof-texts from the Supreme Court that allegedly
“rejected . . . attempts to distinguish between a protected status and conduct
closely correlated with that status.”265 Courts have generally focused
exclusively on the same four cases, using essentially the same boilerplate

262. “[T]he fiction is always ready to give way to a more ‘adequate’ explanation.” FULLER,
supra note 154, at 71.
263. TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 42.
264. Cf. id. at 35 (stating that the “precise origin of a fictional device is . . . almost always
beyond recovery”).
265. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 61 (N.M. 2013). The Superior
Court in Arlene’s Flowers uses the language of a long held tradition from the U.S. Supreme
Court, “that discrimination based on conduct associated with a protected characteristic
constitutes discrimination on the basis of that characteristic.” Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL
720213, at *15 (Wash. Super. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
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citations, without much further discussion as to the appropriateness of
application.266
For example, courts looked to Bob Jones University in support, citing
parenthetically that the Supreme Court held that “discrimination on the
basis of racial affiliation and association is a form of racial
discrimination.”267 Given Bob Jones’ racist history of excluding black
students until 1971,268 hardly anyone is still questioning the underlying
motive of the school in targeting black students on the basis of identity. The
fact that Bob Jones has since apologized for what it called “racially hurtful”
policies is indicative of a failure acknowledged by most.269 Developing legal
precedent through imputation of bad-faith motivation from attenuated
analogies is precisely what undergirds the utility of legal fictions.
Similarly, Lawrence v. Texas270 does little to advance a sound approach to
justifying a non-distinction approach. While the Court in Lawrence was
right to strike down the conduct-based regulation on same-sex sodomy
upheld in Bowers,271 any relevant cross-application would require the shift
from the commission of certain acts to a state mandated endorsement of
those, now decriminalized, acts.272 This step moves us beyond Lawrence;273
which, while emphasizing the liberty of thought, belief, and expression on

266. See, e.g., Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 61–62; Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.,
370 P.3d 272, 280-81 (Colo. App. 2015); Arlene's Flowers, 2015 WL 720213, at *15 (Wash.
Super. 2015).
267. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983).
268. Id. at 580.
269. Statement about Race at BJU, BOB JONES UNIV. (2008), available at
http://www.bju.edu/about/what-we-believe/race-statement.php.
270. The language lifted from Lawrence is, “When homosexual conduct is made criminal
by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.” Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
271. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1985) (The Court was unwilling to
announce “a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.”), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
272. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (“The issue is whether the majority may use the power of
the State to enforce these views on the whole society.”).
273. Although proving a way for the conflation, as pointed out by Professor Nejaime:
In linking sexual-orientation-based identity to sexual orientation-based liberty
(status to conduct), Kennedy connected the more ephemeral sexual
relationship between the petitioners to more permanent same-sex relationships,
thereby suggesting the way in which relationships are linked to the
actualization of identity.
Nejaime, supra note 56, at 1216.
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par with intimate conduct,274 stressed that historical voices condemning
homosexual conduct does not mean that “the majority may use the power
of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of
the criminal law.”275 Using Lawrence to prop up a new theory on nondistinction, at best, is to retroactively insert an answer into the opinion to a
question that was never raised. At worst, it would support the idea that a
majority may enforce its own moral code on the tiny number of business
owners who consider compliance to be sinful.276
The same is true for using Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, typically
cited to support the non-distinction approach based on the language meant
to be applied only in that context. For example, the court in Arlene’s Flowers
cites Martinez with the parenthetical that reads: “University student group's
claim that it did not prohibit gay members, only those who engaged in or
supported same-sex intimacy rejected because prior decisions ‘have
declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context.’”277 This
statement is instructive since whether the group refused to allow gay
members based on identity or conduct is irrelevant since the school’s allcomers policy never required that distinction. As the Court noted, Hastings
interprets the all-comers policy to require that student groups “‘allow any
student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the
organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs.’”278 The Court, in
discussing the potential for making a distinction for excluding certain
students from the all-comers policy, noted the “daunting labor” required of
Hastings to determine whether a student organization is discriminating
based on identity or belief.279 As a remedy for these concerns, neither the
Court, nor Hastings interpreted the non-discrimination policy to conflate
conduct and belief discrimination. Instead, to help the school police its
policy without having to decipher intent based on status or belief, the Court
deferred to the school’s own interpretation that either would be barred in

274. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
275. Id. at 571 (emphasis added).
276. See id.
277. Arlene's Flowers, No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213, at *15 (Wash. Super. Feb 18,
2015) (emphasis added).
278. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 671 (2010). In rejecting the
Christian Legal Societies request for exemption, Hastings reiterated this point by saying that
“CLS must open its membership to all students irrespective of their religious beliefs or sexual
orientation.” Id. at 673.
279. Id. at 688. As the Court stated in its discussion over viewpoint neutrality, “[t]he Law
School's policy aims at the act of rejecting would-be group members without reference to the
reasons motivating that behavior.” Id. at 696.
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this context.280 This context is one based on the reasonableness of
withholding certain benefits and not based on prohibiting certain actions by
force of law that carries a higher burden of proof typically associated for
non-compliance.281
The final case is Bray v. Alexandria, where Justice Scalia wrote that “[a]
tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.”282 While certainly possible,283
this statement is not necessarily true and should not be used as a per se basis
for concluding that a restriction on conduct “serves to disrespect and
subordinate”284 the individual. The Supreme Court acknowledged in
Goldman v. Weinberger that a policy on visible religious articles of clothing
in the military is a reasonable requirement meant to ensure uniformity.285
The Court even noted that for petitioners like Mr. Goldman who wanted to
wear a yarmulke to express his faith, military life and its regulations may
not be suitable.286
While the cases certainly invoke the appropriateness of distinguishing
between status and belief, they do nothing to construct a doctrine that
allows for conclusive conflation of the two. Proper distinctions must be
made in certain instances, which is where we turn to next—picking up
where we left off in Bray.
2. Proper Distinction
The Court in Bray laid out the principles for making the type of
distinction being argued in this Article. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, made these keen observations, worth quoting in full:
Some activities may be such an irrational object of disfavor that,
if they are targeted, and if they also happen to be engaged in
exclusively or predominantly by a particular class of people, an
intent to disfavor that class can readily be presumed. But
opposition to voluntary abortion cannot possibly be considered
280. Id. at 688–89.
281. Id. at 682–83 (“Hastings, through its RSO program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy,
not wielding the stick of prohibition.”).
282. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993). Case otherwise
had nothing to do with Judaism, but with buffer zones around abortion clinics. Id. at 266.
283. The case City of Hialeah is instructive. There, the Supreme Court struck down a law
that intentionally targeted a group of followers who conducted ritualized slaughters. See
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (“[I]t is
only conduct motivated by religious conviction that bears the weight of the governmental
restrictions.”).
284. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
285. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986).
286. Id. at 509.
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such an irrational surrogate for opposition to (or paternalism
towards) women. Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be
denied that there are common and respectable reasons for
opposing it, other than hatred of, or condescension toward (or
indeed any view at all concerning), women as a class—as is
evident from the fact that men and women are on both sides of
the issue, just as men and women are on both sides of petitioners'
unlawful demonstrations.287
These same sentiments were expressed by Justice Kennedy (who joined the
majority in Bray) when he wrote in Obergefell that opposing same-sex
marriage can be “based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical
premises.”288 Premises that in fact represent a comprehensive history
defining the teleology behind marriage as an institution between one man
and one woman inextricably connected with childbearing.289 The historical
287. Bray, 506 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added).
288. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. This statement in application seems in direct tension
with Justice Kennedy’s other statement where he states that the “disability on gays and
lesbians” created by marriage laws that prohibit same-sex marriage and the corresponding
benefits “serves to disrespect and subordinate them.” Id. at 2604. As applied, by invoking the
non-distinction approach, courts are disqualifying any notions of “decent and honorable”
premises in objecting to serving a same-sex wedding by attaching the corresponding stigma
with shopkeepers who refused to serve blacks. I hardly doubt anyone today will accept that
“honorable and decent” premises exist to discriminate against blacks. Cf. Timothy J. Tracey,
Bob Jonesing: Same-Sex Marriage and the Hankering to Strip Religious Institutions of Their
Tax-Exempt Status, 11 FIU L. REV. 85, 86–87 (2015) (“The promise that people of faith may
‘advocate’ and ‘teach’ their beliefs about marriage gives scant assurance that they can in fact
act on those beliefs.”) The dissenters in Obergefell also expressed these concerns. For
example, Justice Robert notes that the majority “suggests that religious believers may
continue to ‘advocate’ and ‘teach’ their views on marriage,” while conspicuously failing to
affirm the right to act (or exercise) on those beliefs. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2625 (Robert, J.,
dissenting). Justice Alito offered this prescient warning:
Perhaps recognizing how its reasoning may be used, the majority attempts . . .
to reassure those who oppose same-sex marriage that their rights of conscience
will be protected . . . . We will soon see whether this proves to be true. I assume
that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the
recesses of their homes, but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk
being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and
schools.
Id. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
289. See, e.g. SHERIF GIRGIS ET AL., WHAT IS MARRIAGE 49–50 (2012) (noting a 2,400-year
philosophical tradition “distinguish[ing] friendships . . . from those special relationships that
extend two people’s union along the bodily dimension of their being and that are uniquely
apt for, and enriched by, reproduction and childbearing”); JOHN WITTE JR., FROM SACRAMENT
TO CONTRACT 17 (2012) (“The Western tradition inherited from ancient Greece and Rome
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teaching of Christianity attests to this long-held view that marriage as union
between one man and one woman is a part of its core teachings on sexual
ethics and remains an inseparable part of Christian humanism.290 The
Supreme Court had largely agreed with this definition up until Obergefell,
including statements from Justice Brennan and Justice Kennedy, who
acknowledged that marriage is a “basic civil right[] . . . fundamental to our
very existence and survival”291 and that states may have “other reasons . . . to
promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an
excluded group.”292 To conflate an opposition to same-sex marriage as a
standard definition for bigotry is simply to ignore the historical
epistemology on marriage and to arbitrarily consigns certain viewpoints to
extinction.
As an illustration of this point: an amicus brief was filed in the
Washington State Supreme Court in favor of Arlene’s Flowers—signed by
nearly thirty of today’s leading First Amendment scholars on both sides of
the marriage debate.293 What this brief argues against is what this Article has
described as the court’s non-distinction approach. Namely, a proper
distinction must be made between Mrs. Stutzman’s religious objection in
celebrating a same-sex marriage and her particular non-objection to serving
same-sex customers.294 By failing to make this distinction, the brief argues
that the Washington Superior Court, in ruling against Mrs. Stutzman,
undervalued her “constitutional rights by misinterpreting her religious
convictions as offensive and invidious.”295 While the brief points out
instances of discriminatory practices based on secondary justifications (i.e.,
refusing entrance to black customers for fears of being robbed)—without
which antidiscrimination laws could not survive—it distinguishes the facts
in Arlene’s Flowers because the justification offered by Mrs. Stutzman for
her refusal was unrelated to the couples sexual orientation.296 While it is
possible that Mrs. Stutzman and others will use some pretense as a cover for
the idea that marriage is a union of a single man and single woman who unite for the
purposes of mutual love and friendship and mutual procreation and nurture of children.”).
290. Matthew J. Franck, Introduction, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS 5–6
(Timothy S. Shah et al, eds. 2016).
291. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
292. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003).
293. Legal Scholar’s Brief, supra note 17.
294. Id. at 3.
295. Id. at 4.
296. Id. at 6. As the brief points out from the record, Arlene’s Flowers has sold
“thousands of dollars worth of arranged flowers [to one of the Appellees] without
reservation, over a nine-year period, with full knowledge that [he] is gay and that many of
the arrangements were intended for his same-sex partner.” Id. at 3.
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bigotry, the court cannot simply assume that into the record, but, instead,
must delve deeper into the sincerity of the claim.297
Notably, the amicus brief cites Lawrence as an example of when “courts .
. . treated an articulated objection to conduct as equivalent to animus
against persons who characteristically engage in such conduct.”298 Although
it may be plausible in certain instances to make this type of conflation (i.e.,
non-distinction approach), the brief warned—citing the “decent and
honorable” language from Justice Kennedy in describing opposition to
same-sex marriage299—that “judges should be cautious about inferring that
disapproval of conduct is a manifestation of animus against persons.”300 As it
applies to Mrs. Stutzman, the brief concludes that making this inference is
“utterly implausible.”301 Having done so, the conflation (or non-distinction)
infected the court’s determination of “prima facie liability” and its
“dismissive treatment of [Mrs. Stutzman’s] constitutional defenses.”302
This was the correct approach and one that I attempt to incorporate in
the next Section by advocating a shift from fictions to rebuttable
presumptions—being mindful of the need to preserve antidiscrimination
laws.
B. From Fictions to Presumptions
The use of fictions today is still evident,303 but oftentimes difficult to
distinguish between presumptions304 since the two are traditionally

297. Id. at 6.
298. Id. at 7.
299. The brief notes that the language from Justice Kennedy “strongly counsels against
conflating a sincere religious objection to promoting same-sex marriage with an imaginary
and uncharitably ascribed discriminatory refusal to serve individuals [based on] their sexual
orientation.” Id. at 20. The same can be said about those who unreservedly serve the LGBTcommunity, as Koppelman points out: “[W]henever someone refuses to discriminate against
gays, that person is often perceived as making a statement of approval of homosexual
conduct.” KOPPELMAN, supra note 38, at 37.
300. Legal Scholar’s Brief, supra note 17, at 8.
301. Id. at 8, 9 (“Stutzman’s religious objection is to same-sex marriage, regardless of the
sexual orientation of the parties to the marriage, not to serving individuals based on their
sexual orientation.”).
302. Id. at 10.
303. See Lind, supra note 154, at 95 (providing a nineteenth century example where John
Marshall created a fiction of “vessel personification” that “grew to become the preeminent
American theory of the ship”); Del Mar, supra note 179, 246–48 providing a twentieth
century example from the House of Lords involving a fiction that “allowed the law to adapt
and remain responsive to the claims of plaintiffs in personal injury litigation”); TWO BODIES,
supra note 159, at 36 (“fictions are by no means extinct”); FULLER, supra note 154, at 93 (We
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considered as a type of assumption.305 This makes a normative shift from
one to the other much easier and much more appropriate, especially “where
the operative fact is probable.”306 This conceptual nearness (especially with
conclusive presumptions)307 provides an opportunity for fixing the nondistinction approach by making a relatively small cognitive transition that
still allows for antidiscrimination laws to retain their purpose, while also
allowing for First Amendment defenses.
In comparing a fiction with a presumption, Vaihinger defines the former
as a statement where its opposite is already certain, while the latter is a
temporary hold until the opposite is established.308 Fuller describes fictions

know that the fiction is being used in contemporary law. . . . [Judges] will probably continue
to use [fictions] in the future.”); Smith, supra note 159, at 147 (“[T]he law is not only
encumbered by old fictions, but is in danger of having new ones foisted upon it.”).
304. This closeness is exemplified in examples such as the concept of “constructive
notice” where the court would assume that the party had actual notice (despite no actual
evidence) by a showing that the party was in a position where he should have known, but for
some fault of his own did not. See Lobban, supra note 101, at 219. Another example in
premise liability called the “attractive nuisance” doctrine assumes a landowner invited
children onto his property and hold him liable for any harm by virtue of the outcome being
foreseeable. Id. n.109. Like the common law examples listed above, the doctrine of “attractive
nuisance” is part of the tapestry in “exploratory fiction” that allowed common law judges to
“feel their way incrementally towards some new legal principle or theory.” K. Scott
Hamilton. Prologomenon to myth and fiction in legal reasoning, common law adjudication
and critical legal studies, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1449 (1989).
305. Raymundo Gama, Presumptions and Fictions: A Collingwoodian Approach, in LEGAL
FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 348 (2015). Baker notes the fashion of calling
“irrebuttable presumptions” as “living and healthy examples of the fiction.” TWO BODIES,
supra note 159, at 38.
306. See Del Mar, supra note 179, at 232–33. Fuller writes that between employing
fictions, presumptions, or estoppels, “[w]hich device will be employed depends upon which
is most expedient.” FULLER, supra note 154, at 75.
307. Taking Fuller’s definition, like fictions, conclusive presumptions are generally
applied when the opposite is known to be true. FULLER, supra note 154, at 41. He offers the
example in the context of a grantee presumed to have accepted a gift despite the individual
having no knowledge of the gift and could not have accepted it. Id. Fuller writes that
conclusive presumptions “‘attach[] to any given possibility a degree of certain to which it
normally has no right.’” Id. at 42 (quoting TOURTOULON, supra note 165, at 398). In this way,
it can be compared to when courts assume that a denial of request is tantamount to a denial
of the individual’s identity, thereby creating a conclusive presumption without an offer for
rebuttal. If the difference is not clear, the advantage gained is that transitioning will be easier
from legal fictions, to conclusive then rebuttable presumptions.
308. See Kelsen, supra note 95, at 10–11. One can imagine this in an instance where a
man is in the country when his wife conceives a child from an adulterous relationship and
everyone knows it. A legal fiction would treat this man as if he was the father, attaching all
the legal norms and duties that would normally attach if the child was conceived in wedlock.
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as an assumption “known to be false” while “a presumption (whether
conclusive or rebuttable) assumes something that may possibly be true.”309
Particularly with rebuttable presumptions, this assumption can also be
something that is probably true.310 To say this another way, a legal fiction
can be read as a “necessary deviation from reality” while a presumption is a
“contingent conformity with truth.”311 When courts employ the nondistinction approach, they are consciously affirming the non-existence of
some reality instead of seeing it as a potential truth. For example, when
courts refuse to delve into the difference between status and conduct by
simply conflating the two based on some doctrine of “inextricabe
connectivity,” what the court is saying is not that we are assuming that no
difference exists, but for the purpose of the law, no difference actually
exists—contrary to reality. The language, for example, by the judge in
Sweetcakes by Melissa is clear that he believed that the case was not about a
wedding cake, but about a business’s refusal to serve someone because of
their sexual orientation—despite the fact that the Klein family, like
Barronelle Stutzman and Jack Phillips, plead that their refusal had nothing
to do with the individual’s sexual orientation.
Whatever the distinctions are, it is best to suspend the legal fiction
and/or a conclusive presumption approach and adopt an approach based on
a rebuttal presumption.312 Del Mar sets this up well when he differentiates
between legal fictions as suspensions of operative facts and presumptions as
considerations of the likelihood of an operative fact being present, allowing
for its introduction, but afterwards shifting the burden to the opposing
While Kelsen has qualms about the reality of this analogy offered by Vaihinger, he does agree
that “[a] fiction . . . would only emerge if one identified this legal notion of a ‘father’ with the
natural object of the male progenitor who bears the same name.” Id. at 11.
309. FULLER, supra note 154, at 40.
310. Id. Fuller notes that the difference between a rebuttable presumption and conclusive
ones may in some cases be a matter of degree—admitting further that the “mental process
involved in the invention of the ordinary fiction is at least a close relation to that involved in
the establishment of a presumption, and suggests the possibility that there may be a
primitive, undifferentiated form of thought that includes both.” Id. at 42, 48; see also Smith,
supra note 159, at 155 (offers conclusive presumptions as examples of surviving fictions).
This supports that the mental step required for transitioning between a fiction to a rebuttable
presumption is not so dramatic.
311. Gama, supra note 305, at 348.
312. One helpful conceptual definition is that a presumption “sometimes describes a
statement about the usual connection between two facts, according to which the assertion of
the existence of one of these facts entitles one to presume the existence of another fact.”
Gama, supra note 305, at 355. In our case, judges can assume that rejecting a request by a
minority group may very well be the product of bigotry, but not always as evidenced in the
Hands on Original and Azucar Bakery cases.
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party for an opportunity to rebut.313 This approach is reinforced by Nicholas
Rescher’s “cognitive presumptions” definition that says presumptions are
created for filling the gaps in our information “until there is evidence to the
contrary.”314
Looking to the facts in the above-mentioned cases and our operative fact
being that a distinction in fact does exist, a conceptual shift from fictions to
presumptions would allow for the court to assume the non-distinction
approach so long as the opposing parties are given an opportunity to rebut
this presumption.
C. Rebuttable Presumption Model
Whatever the advantages of my rebuttable presumption approach, the
transition would at least provide the legal community explanatory evidence
as to how the court made its decision. Where fictions are often disguised in
legal language and undetectable intent, presumptions have the advantage of
being explicit in their use—allowing parties to understand the principles
being applied and what behavior is expected of them for compliance.315 This
rebuttal will require a three-step burden of proof, focusing on: sincerity,
expressive acts, and readily available alternative.316
1. Sincerity
Generally for judges, the veracity of a claimant’s belief cannot be
challenged.317 The Supreme Court in United States v. Ballard quoting a
313. Del Mar, supra note 179, at 226. He also acknowledges the possibility to simply
refuse to accept proof on the issue so as to make it a conclusive presumption. Id.
314. Gama, supra note 305, at 358; see also Edna Ullman-Margalit, On Presumption, 80 J.
OF PHIL. 143, 151 (1983) (“[I]t may turn out that the very point of some presumption rules . .
. [is to provide] the agent with a baseline for action which is to be abandoned just in case
some counter indication is more or less thrust upon him.”).
315. See TWO BODIES, supra note 159, at 49 (stating that the “use of words such as
‘presume’ . . . is an open indication of how the speaker is using words and extending
principles”); cf. 15 Williston on Contracts § 44:12 (4th ed.) (“[I]t is better to state the law in
terms of reality if for no other reason than to prevent confusion.”). By replacing the nondistinction approach with the shifting burden analysis described above, courts will take a
“step toward a sensible reconciliation of the laws and policies promoting both
antidiscrimination and religious and expressive freedom.” Legal Scholar’s Brief, supra note
17, at 15.
316. Recall that Del Mar’s approach “is one closely related to the ways in which a court
manages or adapt to difficulties of proof.” Del Mar, supra note 179, at 237. This methodology
should reduce these concerns given the jurisprudence behind sincerity and the already
available proof for what is and is not an expressive act.
317. Anna Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, 3(1) OXFORD J. LAW & RELIGION 28, 31 (2016).
The Internal Revenue Service has noted in its manual that it “can’t consider the content or
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decision form 1872 noted that the “law knows no heresy, and is committed
to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.”318 Of course, this
notion was not new in the 1940s—or the 1870s. The idea of disallowing
judges to question the truthfulness of religious dogma was stated by James
Madison when he wrote that allowing for this
implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent judge of
Religious Truth; or that he may employ Religion as an engine of
Civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the
contradictory opinions of Rules in all ages, and throughout the
world: the second an unhallowed perversion of the means of
salvation.319

source of a [lawful] doctrine alleged to constitute a particular religion.” Internal Revenue
Serv.,
Internal
Revenue
Manual,
Part
4.76.6
(Oct.
24,
2014),
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-076-006.html#d0e698; see also Tracey, supra note
288, at 111 (“[T]he IRS must give deference to what the organization calls religious.”).
318. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S 78, 86 (1944) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.
679, 728 (1872)) (internal quotations omitted). The Court went on to write:
[w]ith man’s relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they
impose, and the manner in which an expression shall be made by him of his
belief on those subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided always the
laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and the morals of
its people, are not interfered with.
Id. at 87 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)); see also James Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in WRITINGS (Library of
Congress 1999) (“Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate”); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (“[T]he [First] Amendment embraces two
concepts—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of
things, the second cannot be.”).
319. Madison, supra note 318, at 32. Commenting on disestablishment of religion as a
means to protecting the basic principles of separation of church and state, Jefferson wrote
that disestablishment prohibited government “from intermeddling with religious
institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises” and from “the power of effecting any
uniformity of time or matter among them. Fasting & prayer are religious exercises. The
enjoining them is an act of discipline. Every religious society has a right to determine for
itself the time for these exercises, & the objects proper for them, according to their own
peculiar tenets.” Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Rev. Samuel Miller [1808], in WRITINGS 1186–87
(Library of Congress 1984). See generally JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 60 (4th ed. 2016).
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These sentiments go further back to John Locke who circumscribed the
jurisdiction of the state to those things unrelated to salvation—noting that
“the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate.”320
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this ideal again and again in
subsequent cases. It has stated that the door of the Free Exercise Clause
stands tightly closed to: government regulation of religious beliefs,321
punishment of doctrines the government finds false,322 question the
centrality of a particular belief,323 nor condition a benefit on violating a
religious tenet.324 Richard Garnett says this plainly: “[P]ublic officials may
inquire into the sincerity, but not the consistency, reasonableness, or
orthodoxy of religious beliefs.”325 The Tenth Circuit summarized these
principles well in its Hobby Lobby decision when it wrote that the claimants
had “drawn a line at providing coverage for drugs or devices they consider
to induce abortions, and it is not for us to question whether the line is
reasonable.”326 This does not mean that judges cannot hold orthodox

320. Su, supra note 317, at 31. See also Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 368 (2002); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 218 (Shapiro ed. 2003).
321. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963).
322. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“[G]overnment may not compel
affirmation of religious belief, punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be
false, impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status.”) (internal
citations omitted); see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (“[T]o condition the availability of
benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith
effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.”); Thomas v. Review Bd.
Of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be accepted,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in . . . religion.”); accord Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751, 2778–79 (2014).
323. Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Smith, 374 U.S. at 886-87. The Court
has also “reject[ed] the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one
must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization.” Frazee v. Ill.
Dept. of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989).
324. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981).
325. Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We
Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 848 (2009)
326. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d at 1114, 1141 (2013), accord Thomas,
450 U.S. at 715.
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beliefs, but it does mean that in the arena of judicial decision-making,
judges are to refrain from deciding questions relating to orthodoxy.327
However, courts are given some latitude to distinguish a sincerely held
religious belief with a sham purpose or pretext in an effort to obtain the
benefit of law.328 Looking again to the Tenth Circuit, the court, in
examining a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), summarized this discretion well when it wrote
that sincerity requires determining whether a claimant “is seeking to
perpetrate a fraud on the court” or “whether he actually holds the beliefs he
claims to hold.”329 In extreme cases, a court can also refuse to acknowledge a
“claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled
to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”330 With the cases mentioned
above, I would even promote the introduction of extrinsic evidence (e.g.
statements, publications) to show invidious intent—an approach used with
the so-called Muslim travel ban issued by President Trump.
2. Expressive act
The second step in this analysis requires that the public accommodation
is one that engages in expressive acts protecting by the First Amendment.331
Those who argue for exemptions for the florists, bakers, and photographers
base their thinking by showing how these businesses engage in artistic
services.332
For example, in the Elane Photography, leading First Amendment
scholars Eugene Volokh and Dale Carpenter filed an amicus brief where
327. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) (“Government must keep out of internal
problems of religious bodies when those problems concern religious understandings.”).
328. Su, supra note 317, at 32; see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005)
(“[P]rison officials may appropriately question whether a prisoner's religiosity, asserted as
the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic.”); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 185 (1965) (stating that the “threshold question of sincerity” is whether a belief is “truly
held”); Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 n.28 (“[A] corporation's pretextual assertion of a religious
belief in order to obtain an exemption for financial reasons would fail.”).
329. Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014); Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d
1198, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015).
330. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715; see also Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, 178 F. Supp. 3d 819, 830 (D.
Neb. 2016) (holding that FSMism [i.e., Flying Spaghetti Monster] is beyond the protection of
RLUIPA); Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (stating that the eating cat
food was not a religious belief entitled to constitutional protection).
331. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602–03 (1998) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“[A]rtistic expression lies within this First Amendment protection.”).
332. See Haley Holik, You Have the Right to Speak by Remaining Silent: Why a State
Sanction to Create a Wedding Cake Is Compelled Speech, 28 REGENT U. L. REV. 299 (2016).
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they argued that photography is fully protected by the First Amendment,
regardless if the service is being offered for money.333 They argued that
while neither political nor scientific speech is present, the right enjoyed by
Elane Photography is still protected as a “special case of the broader
proposition that visual expression is as protected as verbal expression.”334
They base their arguments largely on Supreme Court precedent in Wooley
v. Maynard, where a license plate slogan that read “Live Free or Die” was
successfully challenged on a claim that forcing the plaintiff to display it on
their car breached a long-standing prohibition on government compelled
speech that states an individual is protected from being compelled to
become a “courier for [the government’s] message.”335 Based largely on this
precedent,336 if photography is an expressive act protected by the First
Amendment, then the doctrine set-out in Wooley protects Elane
Photography337 from being forced to comply with the request to photograph
a wedding or display such photos on the company’s website.338
333. Cato Institute Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellants, at 8, Elane Photography v.
Willock (N.M. 2014), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/ElanePhotog-filed-brief.pdf.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 6 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 714, 717 (1977)) “The First
Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the
majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find
morally objectionable.” Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
336. The Brief also relied on a Supreme Court case out of West Virginia involving a high
school requirement to salute the American flag—deciding likewise that to force the student
to do so amounted to compelled speech. See West Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943). The compelled speech idea was also emphasized in Hurley v. GLIB when the
Supreme Court wrote that “one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is
that one who chooses to speak may also decide ‘what not to say.’” Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Public Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (plurality opinion)); see also Pacific Gas, 475
U.S. at 11 (“[A]ll speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave
unsaid”); Cato Institute Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellants, at 12, Elane Photography
v.
Willock
(N.M.
2014),
available
at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/Elane-Photog-filed-brief.pdf. (stating that
the “compelling the creation of speech (including for money) interferes with the ‘individual
freedom of mind’ at least as much as compelling the dissemination of speech does”).
337. See Cato Institute Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellants, at 11-12, Elane
Photography
v.
Willock
(N.M.
2014),
available
at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/Elane-Photog-filed-brief.pdf.( stating that
the “requiring someone to create speech is even more of an imposition . . . than is requiring
the person to simply engage in ‘the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license
plate’”).
338. Id. at 9.
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Similarly, in Arlene’s Flowers, a number of amicus briefs argued that the
refusal to create a floral arrangement for a same-sex wedding is also
protected under the compelled speech doctrine. The Cato Institute, a
libertarian think-tank, offered an extensive dive into the expressive
significance of floral design—pointing out the existence of a number of
schools of floristry art around the world, as well as various cases that
recognized the various art forms protected under the First Amendment.339
The Becket Fund, a premier First Amendment non-profit, also emphasized
the communicative message of Mrs. Stutzman’s services, noting that in
creating a flower arrangement, the “florist must integrate her understanding
of the couple with her own artistic style, and create a theme that carries
through all parts of the wedding[.]”340
Others have likewise argued, in support of Masterpiece Bakery, that
baking a cake is a communicative act protected by the First Amendment.341
a. Non-application of certain cases
On the other hand, under this prong, cases like the Tennessean man who
put-up a sign stating “No Gays Allowed,” 342 the Norwegian hairstylist who
refused to serve a woman wearing hijab,343 or the Social Security
Administration employee who claimed watching a short video on LGBT
diversity would amount to endorsing “an abomination,”344 would lose
339. See Cato Institute Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellants, at 5–10, Arlene’s
Flowers
v.
Ingersoll
(Wash.
2016),
available
at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/arlene-flowe-cover.pdf.
340. Beckett Fund Amicus Brief in Support of the Appellants, at 8, Arlene’s Flowers v.
Ingersoll
(Wash.
2016),
available
at
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A08/916152%20Amicus%20%20The%20Becket%20Fund.pdf.
341. See Holik, supra note 332, at 302–05 (“Over hundreds of years, wedding cakes
evolved with the advancement of culinary art.”).
342. Tennessee hardware store puts up ‘No Gays Allowed’ sign, USA TODAY (July 1, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2015/07/01/tennessee-hardware-storeno-gays-allowed-sign/29552615/. The man later replaced the sign with: "We reserve the right
to refuse service to anyone who would violate our rights of freedom of speech & freedom of
religion." Id.
343. Norwegian hairdresser could be jailed for refusing salon entry to woman with hijab,
RT NEWS (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.rt.com/viral/358353-norwegian-hairdresser-hijab-jail/.
The woman later commented on Facebook: “Lawful? Maybe not. But we still have freedom
of speech?" Id.
344. Ben Guarino, ‘I’m not going to certify sin’: Social Security worker refuses to watch
POST
(Sept.
14,
2016),
LGBT
training
video,
WASHINGTON
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/09/14/im-not-going-tocertify-sin-social-security-worker-refuses-to-watch-lgbt-training-video/. The man “cited his
right under the Constitution to religious freedom in support of his refusal.” Id.

726

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:663

despite making similar defenses. The Supreme Court in O’Brien was right
when it refused to “accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”345 Providing this layer of
stratification346 will further emphasize the distinct nature of artistic services
versus those individuals who behave in discriminatory fashion like those
instances surrounding the Fair Housing Act of 1968347 and Bob Jones
University.
Two recent examples of individuals who fall outside the protection of
this approach are worth noting. Both instances involve the type of
discriminatory practices rightfully targeted by antidiscrimination laws and
both instances create troubling ramifications for other religious liberty
issues.
The first is the case out of Illinois where the owners of the TimberCreek
Bed & Breakfast refused to host any and all “same-sex civil unions” and
“same-sex weddings.”348 In a series of email exchanges with the gay couple,
one of the business owners, James Walder (“Respondent”), made it explicit
that he believed that “homosexuality is wrong and unnatural based on what
the Bible says” and would under no circumstances host a same-sex
marriage.349 In response, one of the couples, Todd Wathen (“Petitioner”),
told Mr. Walder that the State of Illinois in passing the Illinois Human
Rights Act made it illegal to discriminate against people on the basis of their
sexual orientation and that, as a business, they need to comply with the law

345. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
346. Professor Wilson provides helpful content on this point, noting that “objector’s
claim weakens when it extends to services routinely provided by commercial entities, such as
renting a banquet hall . . . [and] when less direct actions are at stake” in respects to providing
a commercial service. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 160.
347. Prior to the passage of the Act, “religious white landlords” considered leasing their
premises to blacks a violation of the tenets of their faith on race mixing. See Eskridge, supra
note 53, at 677 (“Act required landlords leasing more than three units to refrain from race
discrimination”).
348. Wathen v. Walder Vacuflo, Inc., Charge No. 2011SP2489 (Illinois Human Rights
Commission
Sept.
15,
2015),
available
at
http://www.paxtonrecord.net/sites/all/files/pdf/2015/09/17/Wathen-liabilitydetermination.pdf; see also Vikki Ortiz Healy, Ruling sides with same-sex couple turned away
by bed-and-breakfast, CHICAGO TRIB. (Sept. 17, 2015) (discussion on background and ruling
by
the
Illinois’
Human
Rights
Commission),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-lgbt-business-services-decision-met20150917-story.html.
349. Wathen, supra note 348, at 5. The Commission would later call this “discriminatory
animosity.” Id. at 18.
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and “keep their opinions to there [sic] self.”350 In its discussion, the
Commission made two noteworthy points.
First, the Respondent tried to argue that the First Amendment protects
their right of refusal because the expressive act involved in same-sex unions
is transferred (i.e., “conduit” theory) onto the hosts.351 The argument made
is that to open the Respondent’s venue to host same-sex ceremonies is
tantamount to the compelled speech instances prohibited under the First
Amendment.352 The host in providing the venue is implicitly endorsing the
message that “two individuals in love can enter into a relationship that
mimics marriage in contravention to certain passage in the Bible.”353 The
Commissioner based its rejection of this argument on the fact that the
newly acquired state rights for same-sex unions (under the “Religious
Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act”) coupled with the Human Rights
Act is what mandates the Respondent to treat all-comers alike and the
Respondent had not alleged that it is against their religion to treat
individuals equally.354
Second, the Commissioner also noted that the Respondent would likely
fail in showing a substantial burden under Illinois’ Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) since their presence may not be required and
they in either case allow for same-sex guests to rent out a rooms without
inquiring into their sexual orientation.355 While the Commissioner is
treading dangerously close to the line of appropriate inquiry under RFRA’s
sincerity prong—arguable too far by connecting inconsistent application of
belief356 as evidence of insincerity—its general approach in being skeptical
that a substantial burden can be met is likely correct since Respondent’s
“participation” in the same-sex wedding goes only so far as providing a
venue and related services.357 The Commissioner is also right to reject the
“conduit” theory if for no other reason than for the troubling crossapplication it has for other religious liberty issues (discussed below).
The second case comes out of Idaho where owners of the wedding venue
(Hitching Post) refused to allow a same-sex wedding to take place on their
property. While this case provides little to the discussion above, one thing is
350. Id. at 6.
351. Id. at 24.
352. Id.
353. Id. (citing Respondent’s reply brief at 19).
354. Wathen, supra note 348 at 25.
355. See id. at 22–23 (stating that the “in both cases all that Respondent would be
required to do is to provide a space for its same-sex guests to conduct an activity”).
356. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”).
357. See Wathen, supra note 348, at 25.
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important to note is that the Hitching Post won their case in settling with
the city because it “reorganized as a religious corporation.”358 Perhaps
changing the status of one’s business is a prudent first option instead of
dragging on a lawsuit or simply shutting down for good.359
b. Advantage of non-application
Escaping litigations in instances where the issue involves no artistic
services is the prudent route. Avoiding litigation allows individuals to save
time, money, and face before the court of public opinion. Adding to this is
the benefit of avoiding setting bad precedent (even if you win) that may
allow lawyers to argue that opening a venue for certain events is tantamount
to an endorsement. This creates troubling precedent in two important
religious liberty issues: Equal Access and Graduation Prayer.
The earliest significant equal access case was decided by the Supreme
Court in Windmar v. Vincent (1981),360 codified in its application to public
high schools by the Equal Access Act of 1984,361 and subsequently
358. Jake Thomas, Hitching Post lawsuit settled by city of Coeur d’Alene, INLANDER (May
3, 2016), http://www.inlander.com/Bloglander/archives/2016/05/03/hitching-post-lawsuitsettled-by-city-of-coeur-dalene; see also Scott Maben, Coeur d’Alene wedding chapel suit ends
(May
3,
2016),
in
$1,000
judgment,
SPOKESMAN-REVIEW
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2016/may/03/coeur-dalene-wedding-chapel-suit-endsin-1000-judg/.
359. See Kelsey Harkness, Fearing Another Lawsuit, Christian Business Owners Stopped
Hosting All Weddings, Now Their Business Is Dead, DAILY SIGNAL (June 19, 2015),
http://dailysignal.com/2015/06/19/fearing-another-lawsuit-christian-business-ownersstopped-hosting-all-weddings-now-their-business-is-dead/. This much was suggested by
Joseph Singer who said that “we must define the parts of social life where we allow owners to
exclude based on religion.” Singer, supra note 5, at 940. Another option as some have already
done be to file “pre-enforcement challenges” challenging existing state laws that would
interfere with a person’s right to refuse requests towards same-sex weddings. See Brush &
Nib Studio v. City of Phoenix, Case No. CV2016-052251 (Sup. Ct. Maricopa, May 12, 2016),
available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/BrushNibComplaint.pdf; 303 Creative LLC v.
Lenis,
Case
No.
1:16-cv-02372
(D.C.
Colorado,
Sept.
20,
2016),
https://adflegal.blob.core.windows.net/web-content-dev/docs/defaultsource/documents/case-documents/303-creative-v.-elenis/303-creative-v-elenis--complaint.pdf?sfvrsn=4.
360. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (concluded that the University of Missouri
could not deny equal access to a religious student group); W. COLE DURHAM, LAW AND
RELIGION 524 (2010). “In early [lower court] cases, this equal access argument achieved
mixed results but largely losses.” Timothy J. Tracey, The Demise of Equal Access and A
Return to the Early-American Understanding of Student Rights, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 557, 565
(2013).
361. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–4074; see also David Brown, Hey! Universities! Leave Them Kids
Alone!: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez and Conditioning Equal Access to a University’s
Student-Organization Forum, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 163, 190–93 (2011) (“Congress passed the
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reinforced by a number of decisions spanning two decades.362 The equal
access doctrine stands for the proposition that—unless it can meet the
highest level of scrutiny363—a public school that creates a limited public
forum cannot discriminate in the use of that forum based on a student
group’s desire to use it to engage in religious worship and discussion.364
While a detailed discussion of equal access will not be the focus of this
Article, my concern is that if courts accept the logic that hosting a same-sex
marriage is synonymous with endorsing the underlying act, then in equal
access cases, parties seeking a strict separation of church and state will argue
that the same is true in violation of the Establishment Clause when public
schools provide open forums for religious activities.365 This fear is
exacerbated further given the Supreme Court decision in Martinez, which
upheld “all-comers” policies that allow universities to withhold benefits if a
[Equal Access] Act because courts were ignoring and misconstruing the Supreme Court's
holding in Widmar”). The Act applies the doctrine set up in Widmar to public high
schools—stating that it is
unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial
assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a
meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a). Applying the logic from Widmar, Justice O’Connor wrote that the
message of the Equal Access Act “is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a State
refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not
neutrality but hostility toward religion.” Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comty. Sch. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
362. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Lamb’s
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford
Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
363. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270 (“University must . . . satisfy the standard of review
appropriate to content-based exclusions”); Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07 (“restriction
must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint . . . and the restriction must
be ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum’”) (internal citations removed).
364. See generally Tracey, supra note 360, at 564–72 (outlines the history of the equal
access); JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 180–88
(2016) (“The principal logic of these cases is that religious students and other parties must be
given equal access to facilitates, forum, and even funds that the public school makes available
to similarly situated nonreligious parties.”).
365. This line of argumentation based on the fears of violating the Establishment Clause
has been consistently used and disposed of by the Court. See, e.g. Lamb’s Chapel, 598 U.S at
395; Mark W. Cordes, Schools, Worship, and the First Amendment, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 9,
22 (2015). However, the Court in Good News Club acknowledged valid forms of arguments
attach based on the Establishment Clause. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120; see also
(acknowledging tension between Establishment Clause and Free Clause).
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student organization conditions leadership on the basis of status or belief.366
According to some scholars, Martinez has killed off equal access at
universities.367 The language of Justice Stevens is indicative of this
conclusion when he wrote in Martinez that schools “need not subsidize
[religious groups], give them its official imprimatur, or grant them equal
access to law school facilities.”368 Justice Alito in his dissent expressed his
concerns that the majority has created a new “principle: no freedom for
expression that offends prevailing standards of political correctness in our
country’s institutions of higher learning.”369
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Bronx Household of Faith moved away
from what appeared to be a straightforward application of the equal access
doctrine—deciding instead that excluding religious worship services does
not violate the Free Speech Clause or the Free Exercise Clause.370 The
Circuit went so far as to strongly suggest that including worship services
might even be a violation of the Establishment Clause based on an
endorsement of religion.371
This same concern emerges also in the context of graduation prayer—
already in a precarious position.372 If claimants win under the theory that
accommodating certain events amounts to endorsing those events, then the
question of having private student prayers during a school facilitated
graduation ceremony will likely trigger Establishment Clause challenges.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010).
Tracey, supra note 360, at 559.
Martinez, 561 U.S. at 703 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 706 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Cordes, supra note 365, at 12.
Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 40–44 (2011); DANIEL O.
CONKLE, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 86 n. 45 (2016) (stating that the “court
found that the exclusion was justified by the school board’s reasonable fear of violating the
Establishment Clause”); see also Cordes, supra note 365, at 28–33 (discussing the decision in
depth). Nothing short of a heckler’s veto mentioned in Good News Club subject to the
perceptions of “the youngest members of the audience” based on a coercion analysis, this
would allow for a de facto endorsement of religion striking down whatever remains of equal
access. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119.
372. See Thomas A. Schweitzer, The Progeny of Lee v. Weisman: Can Student-Invited
Prayer at Public School Graduations Still Be Constitutional?, 9 BYU J. PUB. L. 291, 291 (1995)
(stating that the “[a]fter Lee, numerous observers concluded that the Court had outlawed any
form of prayer at public school graduations”); Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and
Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 810 (2001) (noting that few school policies are likely to survive
after Santa Fe given how most are rooted in a historical purpose of having a prayer at
graduation). I argue that a balance is still available so long as the prayer is genuinely studentinitiated and the school removes itself from the process. See Anton Sorkin, Graduation
Ceremonies: A Prayer for Balancing Sponsorship & Censorship, 41 SIU L. J. 345 (2017).
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The result will likely be synonymous with circuit court decisions that
consider prayer during a graduation a form of an endorsement of religion
by virtue of the school providing a venue and related services.373
The next Section returns to our three-part framework for rebuttable
presumptions, moving into the final step.
3. Readily Available Alternatives
This language is imported from forum analysis cases (although the
principles can be traced further back)374 involving proscribed acts of
content-based discrimination and appropriate time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech. Underlying this Section is the ideal of political
independence described by Richard Dworkin as a “right that no one suffer
disadvantage in the distribution of goods or opportunities on the ground
that others think he should have less because of who he is or is not.”375
While the Section argues that goods must be equally available, it does not
argue that it is the role of the state to ensure that the burden of collecting
those goods remains equal for all people. Sometimes people will need to
drive slightly further so that others can enjoy their First Amendment
privileges, e.g., a peaceful assembly may require a detour.
When considering between destroying a person’s livelihood and
protecting people from systematic discrimination, the goal should be to
place the victim as close as possible to the place he would have been had the
discrimination not occurred, but, at the same time, being mindful of the
scale of corresponding action necessary to remedy the magnitude of
373. See, e.g., A.M. ex rel. McKay v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 510 F. App'x 3, 8 (2d
Cir. 2013); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995). In another interesting case, the court while dealing
with a religiously-theme musical selection for graduation, concluded that the “requirement
that all musical selections be secular was a reasonable action taken to avoid confrontation
with the Establishment Clause.” Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009).
Looking to the “legitimate pedagogical purpose” for suppressing student speech, the Tenth
Circuit has even allowed censoring religious expressions of faith based on a desire to avoid
confrontation. See Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 48, 566 F.3d 1219, 1228–29 (10th
Cir. 2009). The Court—considering whether requiring a valedictorian to apologize prior to
receiving her diploma after sharing her faith without school permission—noted that the
“School District is entitled to review the content of speeches in an effort to preserve
neutrality on matters of controversy within a school environment” and that “the School
District's unwritten policy of reviewing valedictory speeches prior to the graduation
ceremony was reasonably related to pedagogical concerns.” Id. at 1230.
374. See Courtney, supra note 32, at 1504–06 (discussing the logic of the “economic
theory” at common law that warranted public accommodations to serve based on concerns
of virtual monopolies).
375. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 364 (1985).
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harm.376 The Supreme Court, mindful that an absolute right to speak does
not exist in every conceivable location,377 details a number of elements that
could reasonably be included as part of this third-prong of the rebuttable
presumption analysis. Where time, place, and manner restrictions are
imposed, courts are required to consider as part of their analysis whether
alternative forums for the expression is available.378 If courts determine that
the restriction aims to prevent completely the dissemination of certain
forms of expression379 or if the remaining modes of communication are
inadequate,380 the restriction will need to pass the highest level of scrutiny
without the option to “justify a content-based prohibition by showing that
speakers have alternative means of expression.”381
Taking on this language, we can apply the principles in instances when a
same-sex couple faces minimal hardship in finding their services elsewhere.
Even if a party argues that a forum possesses some level of convenience or
advantage, courts are still able to consider why those “same advantages
cannot be obtained through other means.”382 As Justice Stevens noted,
“Although the Court has shown special solicitude for forms of expression
that are much less expensive than feasible alternatives and hence may be
important to a large segment of the citizenry . . . this solicitude has practical
boundaries.”383
While this prong may present some unique factual circumstances,384 for
the cases above, the same-sex couples have had no trouble finding other
376. This Article bases this conclusion largely on the writings of Koppelman and his
reading of Ronald Dworkin. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 22, at 13, 25.
377. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640,
647 (1981); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47–48 (1966); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395, 405 (1953).
378. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976).
379. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
380. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984)
381. Consol. Edison 447 U.S. at 541 n.10 (internal citations omitted).
382. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812. Note the Court’s language: “[N]othing in the
findings indicates that the posting of political posters on public property is a uniquely
valuable or important mode of communication, or that . . . [the] ability to communicate
effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on expression.” Id. (emphasis mine).
383. Id. at 812 n.30 (internal citations omitted).
384. For example, in a case dealing with the use of a municipal facility to put on a
controversial musical, the Court in discussing alternatives noted that other facilities may not
have “the seating capacity, acoustical features, stage equipment, and electrical service that the
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sellers (limited impact) who were more than willing to accommodate their
requests (at times for free). This last step, in requiring alternatives, has been
incorporated into “model statutes” by leading scholars using the language of
“substantial hardship” in their attempts to balance the rights of LGBTmembers and religious business owners.385
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that this “non-distinction approach” is really a legal
fiction (something counter to known facts), which advances the interest of
the courts in using antidiscrimination laws for socially engineering an
atmosphere that protects the LGBT-community from dignitary harms.
While an important process, the pursuit has been done by incorrectly
conflating the forms of discrimination (i.e., identity vs. conduct) thereby
disarming the potential for First Amendment defenses to shine light on the
conflict.
My solution is simple. Courts should replace the legal fiction (i.e., nondistinction approach) with a rebuttable presumption. They can still assume
that the discriminatory intent is the type that is rightfully invidious, but
courts should provide an opportunity for religious claimants to rebut that
presumption by: (1) showing a sincerely held belief; (2) showing that the
requested service is part of those expressive acts protected by the First
Amendment; and, (3) showing that readily available alternative means exist
for acquiring the sought after services.
Coincidentally, the concurring judge in Elane Photography sets us on the
right path despite the outcome of the case:
At its heart, this case teaches that at some point in our lives all of
us must compromise, if only a little, to accommodate the
contrasting values of others . . . That compromise is part of the
glue that holds us together as a nation, the tolerance that
lubricates the varied moving parts of us as a people. That sense of
respect we owe others, whether or not we believe as they do,

show required.” Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975). In
another dealing with restrictions on posting signs on public property, the dissent argued that
“there is no showing that [the] . . . alternatives would serve appellees' needs nearly as well as
would the posting of signs on public property.” Taxpayer for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 820
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
385. See Letter from Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Thomas C. Berg, Carl H. Esbeck,
Richard Garnett, & Robin Fretwell Wilson to Hawaii State Sen. Rosalyn H. Baker (Oct. 17,
2013), available at http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/hawaii-special-session-letter-10-1713-1.pdf.
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illuminates this country, setting it apart from the discord that
afflicts much of the rest of the world.386
While we may not all agree on the definition of marriage, it is certainly in
the price of citizenship that we tolerate the views of others and engage them
in meaningful debate without retreating behind walls of rhetorical
denigration. A common comprise must come through the furnace of
bipartisan communication,387 where both sides adopt a policy of finding a
solution that, in the words of George Washington, “gives to bigotry no
sanction, to persecution no assistance.”
As “exhilarating as it might be simply to crush one’s opposition while the
political momentum happens to be on one’s side,” we are entering a time
when national unity seems desperately in need and “a course of
uncompromising intransigence operates to aggravate rather than calm
cultural conflicts.”388 “If courts consider only the imperatives of
antidiscrimination law, and are oblivious of the free speech issues, the
consequences for speech are likely to be pretty bad.”389 But through this
process, we, as a society, may lose more than we gain in our efforts to
dictate the orthodox views on matters of sexual ethics. A core value of free
speech and the unspoken medicinal value it provides is that it tends to
induce a sort of “open collision of moral views” leading to an “open clash
between earnestly held ideals and opinions about the nature and basis of a
good life.”390 While this Article provides a fairly narrow window into the
ongoing struggles between religion and gay culture, it allows us sufficient
landscape to begin considering the direction we want to take and the good
life that awaits us in a more perfect union.

386. Elane Photography LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 79 (N.M. 2013) (Bosson, J.,
concurring).
387. See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 277
(2016) (stating that “the constitutional process must seek to involve all voices and values in
the community”).
388. Legal Scholar’s Brief, supra note 17, at 13.
389. Koppelman, supra note 21, at 1143.
390. Id. at 1152. “If we are going to have transparency, if we are to escape the solitary
confinement of our own minds, then we are going to have to learn to live with moral
confrontation.” Id. at 1154.

